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Recent Decisions
ACT OF STATE-ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE NOT A BAR TO ADJUDICA-

TION OF A COUNTERCLAIM

The following bracketed discussion is quoted from the comment on the Second
Circuit'sdecision that appeared in 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503-12 (1972)
(footnotes renumbered):

[Plaintiff, Banco Nacional de Cuba (hereinafter Banco),' brought
suit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to
recover the excess realized on the sale of collateral that secured a one
year renegotiated loan2 for ten million dollars 3 made in 1960 by
defendant, First National City Bank of New York (hereinafter
Citibank). Shortly after the renegotiation, the Cuban Government
nationalized defendant's eleven Cuban branch offices.4 Citibank sold
the collateral for an estimated twelve million dollars, and retained the
entire amount on the grounds that the excess over the amount of the
loan could be retained as partial compensation for the expropriated
properties. Ruling that the holding announced in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino' was, in effect, overruled by the Hickenlooper

1. Banco was the financial agent of the Cuban Government: "There is no
serious question that the Government of Cuba and Banco Nacional are one and
the same.... ." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York,
270 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2. The original loan was made by First National City to Banco de Desarrollo
Economicoy Social (Bandes), a corporate agency of the Government of the
Republic of Cuba, for fifteen million dollars. After the Castro Government seized
control of the Republic of Cuba, the loan was renewed for another year
commencing on July 8, 1959. Cuban Law No. 730, February 16, 1960 and Law
No. 847, June 30, 1960, dissolved Bandes and declared Banco successor to the
rights and obligations thereof, including the obligation to repay the loan. 270 F.
Supp. at 1005.
3. When the loan was renegotiated on July 7, 1960, Banco repaid five million
dollars and Citibank released approximately one-third of the collateral. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d 394, 395
(2d Cir. 1970).
4. Executive Power Resolution No. 2, issued September 17, 1960, left no
doubt that the confiscations were permanent. Text reprinted in 270 F. Supp. at
1009 n.6.
5. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

amendment 6 and that the amendment was applicable, the district
court granted summary judgment for Citibank. 7 On appeal, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.8 Citibank petitioned the

6. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970): "(2)Notwithstandirg any other provision
of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such a state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other
taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles
of international law, including the principles of compensation and other standards
set out in this subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable
(1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international
law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property acquired pursuant
to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in
good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case
with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with
the court."
7. "The Sabbatinoamendment is inapplicable 'inany case with respect to which
the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in
that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a
suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.' 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). However, since the Executive Branch has maintained silence
for the six years that this action has been pending, it is clear that it has not
determined that foreign policy interests of the United States require application
of the act of state doctrine here." 270 F. Supp. at 1010 n.8. The nationalization
was determined to be in violation of international law. "The totality of
circumstances presented by this case-a patent failure to provide adequate
compensation, a retaliatory confiscation by a foreign government, and discrimination against the United States nationals-compel a finding that the Cuban decree
directing confiscation of First National City's property was in direct contravention of the principles of international law." 270 F. Supp. at 1010. Plaintiff did not
dispute Citibank's right to the ten million dollars derived from the sale: Banco
only contested the retention of the excess.
8. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970). The court held that the Hickenlooper
amendment was not applicable in this instance, by indulging in a strained
interpretation of congressional intent. "If one fact is clear from the legislative
history [of the Hickenlooper amendment], it is that this language was designed to
be invoked by American firms in order to afford them 'a day in court'-and
presumably a monetary recovery-when some other entity attempted to market
the American firm's expropriated property ...

."

431 U.S. at 402. Since Banco

was not attempting to market the expropriated property, the Court found that
the Hickenlooper amendment did not apply to the instant case. Professor Lillich
Vol. 6-No. 1
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Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on October 13, 1970.1 On
November 17, 1970, the Legal Adviser to the State Department sent a
letter to the Supreme Court, expressing the opinion of the executive
branch that the act of state doctrine should not be applied in this

suggests that the interpretation of the legislative history came from Banco's brief.
Illich, 1970 Survey of New York Law: International Law, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 263, 269-80 (1971). The court added that failure to apply the act of state
doctrine would run counter to what Congress had intended to be the statutory
method of recovery. International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § §
1621-43 (1970). Pertinent sections of this act are set out below.
§ 1623(h): "The Commission shall notify all claimants of the approval or
denial of their claims, stating the reasons and grounds therefor, and, if approved,
shall notify such claimants of the amount for which such claims are approved.
Any claimant whose claim is denied... shall be entitled, under such regulations as
the Commission may prescribe, to a hearing before the Commission, or its duly
authorized representatives, with respect to such claim.... The action of the
Commission in allowing or denying any claim under this subchapter shall be final
and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not subject to review by the
Secretary of State or any official, department, agency, or establishment of the
United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise."
§ 1643: "It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide for the determination
of the amount and validity of claims against the Government of Cuba... [arising]
out of nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other takings of, or special
measures directed against, property of nationals of the United States... arising
out of violations of international law by the Government of Cuba... in order to
obtain information concerning the total amount of such claims against the
Government of Cuba... on behalf of nationals of the United States. This
subehapter shall not be construed as authorizing an appropriation or as any
intention to authorize an appropriation for the purpose of paying such claims."
§ 1643(b)(a): "The Commission shall receive and determine in accordance
with applicable substantive law, including international law, the amount and
validity of claims by nationals of the United States against the Government of
Cuba... arising since January 1, 1959, in the case of claims against the
Government of Cuba... for losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking of, or special measures directed against,
property including any rights or interests therein owned wholly or partially,
directly or indirectly at the time by nationals of the United States."
§ 1643(e): "In determining the amount of any claim, the Commission shall
deduct all amounts the claimant has received from any source on account of the
same loss or losses."
According to the court, it would seem that Congress wanted this type of claim
to be submitted to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. 431 F.2d at 403.
For a hypothetical example of the settlement of a claim through the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission see 431 F.2d at 404 n.18.
9. Petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3230 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1970) (No. 846).
Fall, 1972
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case. 10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision of
the Second Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration. 11 On remand, Citibank contended that the Second Circuit
should reverse its prior decision because the executive branch had
submitted a "Bernstein letter" 12 which made application of the act of
state doctrine unnecessary.] The Second Circuit, affirming its prior
decision, 11 held that the "Bernstein exception" to the act of state
doctrine should be limited to the facts of the Bernstein case, a holding
that resulted in the court's applying the act of state doctrine. "4 On
writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed.
The act of state doctrine does not necessarily bar adjudication of a
counterclaim against a foreign sovereign. First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
[In Underhill v. Hernandez, 15 the Supreme Court first enunciated
the act of state doctrine. The Court said that "[e] very sovereign state
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of

10. Letter from John R. Stevenson to the clerk of the United States Supreme
Court, the Honorable E. Robert Seaver, Nov. 17, 1970. 442 F.2d at 536-38. The
letter stated in part: "Recent events, in our view, make appropriate a
determination by the Department of State that the act of state need not be
applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or setoff when (a)
the foreign state's claim arises from a relationship between the parties existing
when the act of state occurred; (b) the amount of the relief to be granted is
limited to the amount of the foreign state's claim; and (c) the foreign policy
interests of the United States do not require application of the doctrine.... The
Department of State belives that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to
bar consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or setoff against the Government
of Cuba in this or like cases."
11. The Solicitor General suggested to the Supreme Court that it remand the
case to the court of appeals for the court's further consideration in light of the
State Department's views. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). In remanding the case, the Supreme Court noted
that it was "expressing no views on the merits of the case." 400 U.S. at 1019.
12. For an explanation of the Bernstein letter, see Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaanche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954) (per curiam).
13. 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970).
14. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
15. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). The earliest pronouncement of this doctrine was in
Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876). See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF
DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 64-138

(1964). See generally

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
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the government of another done within its own territory." 16 The first
direct executive intervention in the application of the act of state
doctrine occurred in an attempt to recover property seized by the
Nazi Government. 17 Judge Learned Hand, in Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Fr~res Socidtb Anonyme, 18 applied the act of state doctrine
and refused to consider the validity of the Nazi confiscation. 11 In a
subsequent case 2 ° involving the same seizure, however, the Court
reached the validity of the acts of the Nazi officials and held that the
State Department's letter to the court had expressly released it from
the restraint of the act of state doctrine, 2 thus giving birth to the
so-called "Bernstein exception." Squarely facing the problem of the
application of the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine and held that
United States courts were prevented from examining the validity of
the acts of the Cuban Government "in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles ... ." 22

16. 168 U.S. at 252. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1917),
the Court said: "The principle that the conduct of one independent government
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another ... rests at last upon
the highest considerations of international comity and expediency." 246 U.S. at
303.
17. See Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22
VAND. L. REV. 27, 90 (1968).
18. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. The court reaffirmed its decision in the first Bernstein case, holding that
the act of state doctrine prevented judicial determination of the confiscatory acts
of the Nazi Government because of the lack of definite expression of executive
policy. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
20. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
21. "3. The policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the
United States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu
thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution in
Germany, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of
their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials." Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to Bennett, House & Couts, April 13,
1949, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in
Nazi Forced Transfers, 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592, 593 (May 8, 1949).
22. 376 U.S. at 428. The Court reasoned: "[The act of state doctrine] arises
out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense
Fall, 1972
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The Court avoided passing upon the validity of the "Bernstein
exception" since all doubt concerning executive policy was removed
by the amicus briefs of the executive branch in favor of applying the
act of state doctrine. 23 Subsequently, Congress passed the Hickenlooper amendment. 24 The effect of the amendment was a reversal of
presumptions. Under the Sabbatino decision, courts assume that any
adjudication on the merits of the act of the foreign state would
embarrass the executive in the conduct of foreign policy unless the
executive expresses a contrary view. Under the amendment, the courts
assume that they may proceed with an adjudication of the validity of
the foreign act, unless the President expresses the view that such an
adjudication would impede the conduct of foreign policy. 2 Nevertheless, there was a difference of opinion among the proponents of the
legislation on the scope of the amendment. 2 6 On remand of

of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international
sphere." 376 U.S. at 423.
23. "[R]ather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of the
suit.., even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law." 376 U.S. at 428.
24. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The amendment was reenacted on Sept.
6, 1965, and contained a slight variation from the first Hickenlooper amendment.
The only change was the substitution of "other right to property" for "other
right" in two instances, and the deletion of Proviso 3, which had made the
amendment inapplicalbe to any proceeding commenced prior to January 1, 1966.
"The words 'to property' have been inserted to make it clear that the law does not
prevent banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions from using
the act of state doctrine as a defense to multiple liability upon any contract or
deposit or insurance policy in any case where such liability has been taken over or
expropriated by a foreign state." S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1965). For a discussion of the changes in the amended version of the
Hickenlooper amendment see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166,
171-72 (2d Cir. 1967).
25. S.REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
26. One author of the amendment took a broad view of its scope: "...its
[the amendment's] purpose is not merely to facilitate the occasional recovery of
specific goods or their money equivalent, but rather to restore and confirm a
model in principle and procedure. .

. ."

Hearingson the ForeignAssistance Act of

1965 Before the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1035
(1965) (hereinafter cited as Hearings). Before the House Committee on Foreign
Vol. 6-No. 1
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Sabbatino, the Second Circuit, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,2'
upheld the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper amendment and
applied it to the case. 2 8 The court, having previously determined that
the Cuban law in question was in violation of international law,
reached the merits of the claim by Banco and rendered judgment for
plaintiff. Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the executive
branch had not suggested application of the act of state doctrine, it
should not be applied to the case.?9 ] Another case relevant to the

Affairs, Attorney General Katzenbach expressed a more limited view: "We are
talking about a very isolated, infrequent occurrence which is when American
property that has been nationalized in some way or another finds its way back
into the United States." Id. at 1235. Senator Hickenlooper himself made
contradictory statements regarding the purpose of the amendment. Compare 110
CONG. REc. 19546 (1964) (letter of Senator Hickenlooper to the Washington
Post, July 27, 1964) and id. at 24076 with id. at .19548. In a letter from Professor
Cecil J. Olmstead to Donald M. Fraser, March 29, 1965, Mr. Olmstead posed a
hypothetical, qualifying his remarks made at the hearings. "Thus, if Castro sues a
U.S. bank whose branch he has seized in Havana for return of certain Cuban
Government accounts or collateral held by the U.S. bank, the present U.S. rule
(established in the Supreme Court decision in National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955)) is that by bringing suit Castro has waived sovereign
immunity and that the U.S. bank is permitted to make a counterclaim or setoff
for the value of its seized Havana branch." Hearings,supra at 1306.
27. 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956, rehearing
denied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968). Farr Whitlock received notice on August 23, 1960
that Peter L. F. Sabbatino on August 16 had been appointed temporary receiver
for the assets pursuant to N.Y. CiV. PRAC. ACT § 977-b (1963). Sabbatino was
eliminated when the parties agreed that the Lehman Brothers would hold a sum of
money in escrow to satisfy the final judgment in this case and Sabbatino
transferred $225,000 to Lehman Brothers for that purpose. 383 F.2d at 170-71.
28. "[W]e hold that the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment to this
case does not deprive appellant [Banco] of its property without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment." 383 F.2d at 179. "Thus we find that the
adoption of the Hickenlooper Amendment was not legislative interference with
judicial power violative of the Federal Constitution; to the contrary, we find good
reason for judicial acceptance of this legislative modification of the act of state
doctrine." 383 F.2d at 182. The court also rejected the idea that Congress had
interfered with the executive power. 383 F.2d at 182. "The existing law [the
Hickenlooper amendment] applies to cases pending at the time of its enactment...." S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
29. The district court had waited 60 days before entering final judgment to
allow the President to exercise his right under the amendment; the court was
informed by a letter from the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York on September 25, 1965, that the executive branch had made no
determination that the act of state doctrine should be applied. 383 F.2d at 172
n.7.
Fall, 1972
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question whether the validity of a foreign governmental act is a
justiciable issue in a United States court is National City Bank of New
York v. Republic of China. 30 In that case the Supreme Court held
that when a foreign sovereign sues in the courts of the United States,
the defense of sovereign immunity is not a bar to a counterclaim. The
Court determined that considerations of "fair play" require allowance
of counterclaims against the claim of a foreign sovereign.
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Rehnquist 3 1 observed that the act
of state doctrine is flexible. 3 2 He distinguished Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino on the grounds that the State Department had not
expressed an opinion in that case on whether the Court should apply
the act of state doctrine. In the instant case, however, the State
Department had sent a letter advising the Court not to apply the
doctrine because of the exception carved out in the Bernstein
decision. After considering Sabbatino, Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the "Bernstein exception" was determinative of the instant case
in light of the State Department's letter. Justice Rehnquist premised
his reasoning on the theory that the act of state doctrine is based on
judicial concern that an adjudication by United States courts of the
legality of the acts of a foreign sovereign would hinder the policital
branches of government in their management of the foreign relations
power. 11 Since the executive branch had expressly advised the Court
that the act of state doctrine need not be applied in this case, Justice
Rehnquist determined that the management of foreign relations would
not be impeded by adjudicating the counterclaim. Mr. Justice Douglas,
although concurring in the result that the doctrine should not be
applied, determined that National City Bank v. Republic of China and
not the "Bernstein exception" should govern the instant case,
reasoning that the "fair play" standard established by that decision
required adjudication of the counterclaim to the extent of a set-off.
Justice Douglas made it clear that he would not permit an adjudication of that part of the counterclaim that exceeded a set-off and,

30. 348 U.S. 356. The Republic of China sued an American bank for
$200,000 deposited in the bank. The bank counterclaimed for $1,634,432 on
defaulted treasury notes of the Republic.
31. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White joined in the opinion.
32. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In
the Sabbatino case the Court said: "[I] ts [the act of state doctrine] continuing
validity depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions
between the judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing
upon foreign affairs." 376 U.S. at 427-28.
33. 406 U.S. at 767-68.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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thus, specifically disapproved of the "Bernstein exception." 3 4 Mr.
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, also rejected the applicability
of the "Bernstein exception." He contended that the holding in
Sabbatino was not compelled by the underlying principles of the act
of state doctrine, 35 arguing that when the validity of the act of a
foreign sovereign is at issue, the judiciary should adjudicate the merits
of that act under international law unless to do so would interfere
with delicate foreign relations. Because there would be no interference
with foreign affairs in the instant case, Justice Powell concluded that
the act of state doctrine should not be applied.
Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting, 36 criticized Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that an expression by the executive branch to the
effect that an adjudication of the merits would not embarrass the
Government makes application of the act of state doctrine unnecessary. Justice Brennan noted that the Court had previously decided
that a judicial determination of the merits of a foreign governmental
act may conflict with the interests of the executive branch, 3 7 since a
finding that a foreign state had violated international law could insult
the foreign state involved and hinder any negotiations between the
Executive and the offending country. The dissent admitted that when
the political branch is indifferent to whatever result the court may
reach, adjudication on the merits would not impair the foreign
relations power of the political branches. Justice Brennan argued that
since the United States had already protested the taking of property
by Cuba as violative of international law,
the political branch was
not indifferent in the instant case, and that consequently by agreeing
to hear the claim the Court was engaging in an adjudication that, in
fact, could have only one politically predetermined result-a finding

34. In the Republic of China case, the Court stated: "We have a foreign
government invoking our law but resisting a claim against it which fairly would
curtail its recovery. It wants our law, like any other litigant, but it wants our law
free from the claims of justice." 348 U.S. at 361-62. The Court then ruled that a
sovereign's claim may be reduced by a setoff or counterclaim. 348 U.S. at 364.
35. Justice Powell agreed with the underlying principles of the act of state
doctrine as expressed by Justice Harlan in Sabbatino. He disagreed, however, with
the broad application of these principles. 406 U.S. at 774.
36. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun joined in the dissent.
37. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433 (1964).
Justice Harlan in Sabbatino concluded that the Executive can better protect the
interests of United States citizens than can an occasional judicial determination.
376 U.S. at 431.
38. 406 U.S. at 783.
Fall, 1972
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that the Cuban taking was in violation of international law-since any
other holding would seriously embarrass the Executive in its conduct
of foreign relations. Furthermore, Justice Brennan contended, a
judgment for Banco would seriously compromise efforts by the
Government to secure compensation for property expropriated in
other countries. The main emphasis of the dissent, however, was that
there must be a "proper distribution of functions between the judicial
and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon
foreign affairs." 39 The dissent argued, therefore, that to determine
whether there is such a "proper distribution of functions" considerations other than the mere possibility of Executive embarrassment must
be examined. 40 Justice Brennan reasoned that examination of these
additional considerations leads to the conclusion that the subject
matter of the instant case constitutes a political question not
cognizable in the courts. 41
In the instant case, six Justices rejected the "Bernstein exception,"
but three Justices applied it; two Justices formulated additional
possible exceptions for certain circumstances. The Court failed not
only to accept the opportunity to clarify the status of the act of state
doctrine but also to enunciate a test that could be used by lower
courts in determining whether the doctrine applies. Six Justices,
however, mentioned the use of a "political question test" to decide
whether the act of state doctrine is applicable, and it is suggested that
courts in the future use such a test. This test would implement both
the political question doctrine of the dissent and the "Bernstein
exception" of the plurality. The test, moreover, would involve an
examination of only two basic considerations whereas the opinions in
the instant case formulate three. First, the court should consider
whether there is a consensus among nations on what international
rules govern the outcome of the substantive issue involved. If such a
consensus exists, the court should not apply the act of state doctrine:
in such a case, the court would not be making foreign policy, but
would be serving the proper judicial function of interpreting applica-

39. Justice Brennan was quoting from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
40. These other considerations included the absence of concensus on the
applicable international rules, the unavailability of traditional standards from
treaties or other agreements, the existence and international recognition of the
Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues to national concerns, and the
power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy for all United States citizens
who have been injured. 406 U.S. at 788.
41. Cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962).
Vol. 6-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

ble international law. 4 2 If a consensus on the applicable international
rules does not exist, then the second consideration of the "political
question test" must be examined. The court would consider whether
the executive branch had stated explicitly in a "Bernstein letter" that
no decision rendered by the court would hinder the management of
United States foreign relations. If a "Bernstein letter" is sent and,
upon examination of the letter, the court determines either that
adjudication of the merits could hinder or embarrass foreign relations
or that the letter does not state that any decision reached would not
hinder Executive regulation of foreign relations, the act of state
doctrine would be applied. If, on the other hand, no "Bernstein
letter" were sent, then the act of state doctrine also would preclude
the court from reaching the merits of the suit. Applying this "political
question test" to the instant case, one must consider whether there is
a consensus on the international rules applicable to the substantive
issue before the court-that is, whether the expropriation by Cuba of
defendants' properties violated international law. Sabbatino noted the
absence of a consensus on international rules concerning expropriation, 4 3 and that the lack of concensus is especially true when the
expropriating country is economically underdeveloped. "1 Since Cuba
is regarded as an economically underdeveloped country, 45 a consensus
on this issue does not exist in the present case and the "Bernstein
letter" must be examined. The letter states in part:

42. In Sabbatino the Court concluded: "It should be apparent that the
greater the degree of codification or concensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed
principle to circumstances of fact ... ." 376 U.S. at 428.
43. "There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the
property of aliens." 376 U.S. at 428.
44. "The conflict of attitudes and doctrines, resulting from the clash of
interests between economically developed and economically underdeveloped
countries, corresponding to that between capital exporting and capital importing
countries, has expressed itself in a number of international legal controversies.
"The most widely debated of these controversies is that between the so-called
'minimum standard' and the standard of 'equality of treatment' (with nationals)
in the cases of expropriation of foreign property interests." W. FRIEDMANN,
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 318 (1964).
45. "Cuba is not only typical; in many cases it provides us with caricatures of
some of the major problems in under-developed areas." Blansten, Castroism in
Latin America, 70 COM. L. J. 263, 264 (1965).
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The 1960's have seen a great increase in expropriations by foreign
governments of property belonging to United States citizens. Many
corporations whose properties are expropriated, financial institutions for
example, are vulnerable to suits in our courts by foreign governments as
plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering deposits or sums owed them in the
United States without taking into account the institutions' counterclaims
for their assets expropriated in the foreign country. 4
The letter indicates that the executive branch believes that a
corporation is entitled to redress against the expropriating country.
However, the letter certainly does not indicate executive indifference
to whatever result the Court should reach concerning the legality of
the expropriation. Using this "political question test," therefore, the
Court should have determined that the act of state doctrine applied
and precluded judicial examination of the counterclaim. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, the use of this "political question test"
would clarify a confusing area of the law by providing the lower courts
with a guide for determining whether the act of state doctrine applies
in a particular factual context.
Robert M. Erickson

46. Letter from John R. Stevenson to the Clerk of the United States
Supreme Court, The Honorable E. Robert Seaver, Nov. 17, 1970, quoted in 442
F.2d at 536-38.
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ADMIRALTY--SHIP MORTGAGE ACT OF 1920-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
AGAINST MORTGAGOR IN PERSONAM NOT PRECLUDED BY STATE LAW
WHEN VESSELS WERE SOLD AT PUBLIC FORECLOSURE AUCTION
WITHOUT PRIOR APPRAISAL

Plaintiff, a shipbuilder' and the holder of preferred ship mortgages
that secured a note2 for the purchase price of vessels it had
constructed for defendant,3 brought a mortgage foreclosure action in
the federal district court4 against the vessels in rem and against the
defendant in personam under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.1 The
defendant had refused to pay the note, alleging that the vessels were
unseaworthy. Subsequently, the plaintiff had the vessels seized and

1. J. Ray McDermott & Co. [hereinafter referred to as McDermott], owner of
a shipyard in Morgan City, Louisiana, builds and repairs ships.
2. The promissary note and preferred ship mortgages were duly registered at
the Customs House in New Orleans, Louisiana, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 921
(1970), which provides that a ship's mortgage is to be recorded at the collector of
customs office in the vessel's port of documentation.
3. Texas Menhaden Company, although aware that McDermott had never
built menhaden fishing vessels, contracted with plaintiff to build 8 ships for a
total cost of $2,574,152. The contract to build the vessels had been signed by Mr.
Harvey W. Smith. Mr. Smith was the president of two family-owned corporations-the Texas Menhaden Co. and The Fish Meal Co. The note for the ships was
executed by The Fish Meal Co., with Mr. Smith guaranteeing the loan as surety in
a personal capacity. The in personam action was brought against both The Fish
Meal Co. and Mr. Smith, who are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant.
4. The mortgage foreclosure action was consolidated with defendant's suit
brought in the eastern district of Louisiana against the plaintiff for breach of
contract and for a declaration of nonliability under the notes. The contract
provided, inter alia, that the ships would have a hold capacity of 700 short tons of
fish, an empty ship draft of 6 feet, 6 inches, and a loaded draft of 9 feet, 6 inches.
According to the testimony, however, the boats drew 14 1/2feet of water with only
500 tons of fish in the hold, which impaired their ability to operate in shallow
waters. Because of this and similar evidence introduced at the district court trial,
defendant, with McDermott's consent, attempted to sell the alleged unseaworthy
vessels. When these efforts failed, the vessels were moved to a fresh water bayou in
Texas to prevent deterioration. McDermott libelled the vessels and brought the
foreclosure action in the eastern district of Texas. The parties stipulated to both
the transfer of the breach of contract action to the Texas district court and the
judicial sale of the vessels under the direction of the court.
5. Merchant Marine Act § 30, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§ § 911-84 (1970).
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sold at public auction 6 and although no prior appraisal had been
made, the district court confirmed the sale. Because the proceeds of
the sale were insufficient to satisfy defendant's obligation under the
note,7 plaintiff initiated a separate proceeding seeking a deficiency
judgment for the outstanding balance due on the note. The defendant
contended that because the federal statutes regulating judicial sales do
not contain specific authorization for deficiency judgments where a
public sale without appraisal has occurred, a gap in the federal
procedure exists. The defendant further contended that state law'
fills this gap and that Louisiana law bars deficiency judgments when
the foreclosure sale was made without prior appraisal. The district
court held that state law was inapplicable to a mortgage foreclosure
proceeding under federal maritime law, and granted the deficiency
judgment. 9 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated the
deficiency judgment.'" On rehearing en banc, the United States Court
When
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, vacated and remanded."

6. McDermott submitted the highest bid ($689,000) at the court-supervised
public auction and took possession of the 8 vessels including the engines and other
property installed by the defendant at a cost of approximately $1,000,000.
McDermott posted bond for the net proceeds from the sale, awaiting final
determination of the controversy.
7. The note secured by the preferred ship mortgages was for $3,233,891.36.
The net proceeds from the public sale amounted to $666,747.25, leaving an
outstanding balance of $2,567,144.11.
8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106 (1968) provides: "If a mortgagee or
other creditor takes advantage of a waiver of appraisement of his property,
movable, immovable, or both, by a debtor, and the proceeds of the judicial sale
thereof are insufficient to satisfy the debt for which the property was sold, the
debt nevertheless shall stand fully satisfied and discharged insofar as it constitutes
a personal obligation of the debtor. The mortgagee or other creditor shall not have
a right thereafter to proceed against the debtor or any of his other property for
such deficiency...."
9. The deficiency judgment granted by the district court was $3,233,891.36,
with 6% interest per annum plus attorney fees and court costs, reduced by
$666,747.25-the net proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the 8 vessels.
10. J. Ray McDermott v. The Morning Star, 431 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1970).
The judgment on the breach of contract suit was reversed and remanded for a new
trial. The court held that the jury instructions were erroneous under the law and
the facts of the case.
11. Although the court of appeals vacated the deficiency judgment granted by
the district court, it did so on the grounds that state rather than federal law
applied. On rehearing en banc, the instant court reversed the prior holding, which
had applied state law on the grounds that the opinion was based upon an error of
law. The instant court, however, agreed that the deficiency judgment must be
Vol. 6-No. 1
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vessels have been sold at a public foreclosure auction without prior
appraisal, state law may not proscribe a deficiency judgment action
against the mortgagor in personam under the Ship Mortgage Act of
1920. J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. The Morning Star, 457 F.2d 815
(5th Cir. 1972) (en banc).
The doctrine of uniformity in maritime law has generally required
the invalidation of state laws that prejudice admiralty law.1" The
doctrine can be traced back to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,1 3 in
which the Supreme Court, noting the need for uniformity in the
maritime law, refused to allow a cause of action based on a state
workmen's compensation law. In Garrettv. Moore-McCormack Co.,I 4
a case involving a burden of proof question, the Supreme Court again
looked to general maritime law rather than state law. Prior to the
enactment of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, however, the Supreme
Court had held ship mortgages to be nonmaritime and not within

admiralty jurisdiction."5

Foreclosure proceedings against the ship

were available to a mortgagee in nonmaritime courts,' 6 but maritime
liens were held to be senior to ship mortgages. 1 7 Although a

vacated, since the issue of liability under the contract had been remanded to the
district court for a new trial, and that application for a deficiency judgment must
await the outcome of the breach of contract action.
12. Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law,
64 HARV. L. REv. 246, 256 (1950). See generally Note, The General Maritime
Law v. State Law in Maritime Cases: Which, When, and Why? 50 Nw. U. L. REV.
677 (1955). For a discussion of the doctrine of uniformity in maritime cases
containing an international element see Cheatham & Maier, PrivateInternational
Law and its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV. 27, 65-66 (1968).
13. 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917). The majority in Jensen invalidated the award
of damages under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act to the widow of a
stevedore. The majority reasoned that since the stevedore was killed while
unloading a ship in navigable waters, the action was within admiralty jurisdiction.
14. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
15. See Bogart v. The S.S. John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854) (federal
courts held to be without jurisdiction over a ship mortgage); Canfield, The Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920, 22 MICH. L. REV. 10 (1923).
16. The mortgagee could foreclose the mortgage in state courts, but such an
action could not be entertained in federal district courts unless diversity
requirements were satisfied.
17. The value of the mortgagee's security was reduced, however, because the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale took the vessel subject to the maritime liens. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY
§ 9-47 (1957). A vessel
mortgage is not preferred over a subsequent lien for supplies even where the
materialman knew of the mortgage. The J.E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1 (1893); The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 558 (1874). See note 21 infra.
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mortgagee was allowed to intervene in an in rem proceeding brought

by a maritime lienholder in admiralty, the mortgagee's interest could
be satisfied only if a surplus remained after all maritime claimants had

been paid.' 8 Consequently, the practical effect of subordinating the
mortgagee's interests was that ship mortgages were not attractive

investments. Recognizing this problem, Congress passed the Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920 in an attempt to encourage investment in the
shipping industry. 9 The Act provided security for lendors by
bringing ship mortgages within maritime jurisdiction2" and by
according to them a preferred status over all liens except preferred
maritime liens. 2 ' When the statute is not specific,2 2 courts have
applied either state or federal law. In a recent preferred ship mortgage
case, Bergren v. Davis, 3 the district court reasoned that because the

18. Gyory, Security at Sea: A Review of the Preferred Ship Mortgage, 31
FORDHAM L. REV. 231, 232 (1962).

19. At the end of the First World War, the United States Government had a
wartime fleet that Congress wanted to dismantle. The Ship Mortgage Act of 1920
was passed to facilitate this objective by encouraging private investment in the
shipping industry and to provide protection for the Government when it extended
credit to sell the ships. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at § 9-48.
20. Merchants & Marine Bank v. The T.E. Welles, 289 F.2d 188, 193-94 (5th
Cir. 1961) (superior lien of initial mortgage not extinguished by subsequent
mortgage executed in satisfaction of initial mortgage).
21. 46 U.S.C. § 953 (1970). Preferred maritime liens that are senior to
preferred ship mortgages include: liens prior in time to the recording of the
mortgage; liens for legal costs; tonnage and light dues; taxes; wages of the crew
and master; wages of stevedores employed by the shipmaster; and liens arising out
of liability for collisions. 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN
ADMIRALTY § 11 (6th ed. 1940, Supp. 1971).
22. While the statute contains detailed provisions concerning preferred ship
mortgages in specific areas, it is not comprehensive but is rather a generalized
outline. The statute sets out in specific details three principal areas of ship
mortgages. First, to be a preferred ship mortgage, a mortgage must be valid and
include the whole of a vessel of the United States. In order to maintain a preferred
status the requirements of 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1970) must be fulfilled. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at § 9-52. Secondly, in 46 U.S.C. § 921
(1970) the requirements for public notice through recordation and indorsement
are provided. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at § 9-53. Thirdly, the
statute establishes the priorities among the preferred ship mortgage and other
maritime liens. See note 21 supra. The act also contains sketchy provisions on
foreclosure, providing for an in rem action to enforce the mortgage and an in
personam action by the mortgagee against the mortgagor for any deficiency. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at § 9-57.
23. 287 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1968). In this foreclosure action, the
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ship mortgage is a chattel mortgage that has maritime status, and since
there is no federal law of mortgages except as specifically provided by
statutes such as the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, state law governed the
interstices of federal statutory mortgage law. One year later, however,
the Third Circuit in Mastan Co. v. Steinberg2 4 refused to apply state
law to determine the elements of the good faith requirements in the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 on the grounds that admiralty is a federal
concern
and Congress has provided standards for the enforcement
of admiralty suits; the court reasoned that to engraft the nuances of
the various state laws onto the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 would
abrogate the uniform interpretation of federal statutes.26
In the instant case, the majority noted that federal statutes"
provide procedures for federal judicial sales and grant federal district
courts original jurisdiction in ship mortgage foreclosure actions.2" The
court rejected the defendant's contention that a void in the statutory
scheme exists and concluded that reference to state law is not
necessary to determine the validity of the deficiency judgment in the
instant case. The court read the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 together
with the federal statutes delineating judicial sales procedures and
concluded that these statutes furnish a comprehensive scheme for
foreclosure of the mortgage, the sale of the vessel, 9 and a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor."0 The court found that, while the
federal statute concerning judicial sales3 1 requires appraisal prior to a
defendant alleged failure of consideration. The law of Maine allowed failure of
consideration as a defense, since the court found no federal law of mortgages.
Accord, Southland Financial Corp. v. Oil Screw Mary Evelyn, 248 F. Supp. 520
(E.D. La. 1965).
24. 418 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970). As
required by 46 U.S.C. § 922 (1970), an affidavit was filed that the ship mortgage
was made in good faith. A creditor of the ship, contesting the ship mortgage
priority, contended that a New York statute, which provided that a per se lack of
good faith existed when the mortgagor was insolvent, should apply. The court,
noting the need for uniformity in admiralty, refused to apply state law.
25. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
26. 418 F.2d at 179.
27. 28 U.S.C. § § 2001-07 (1970).
28. 46 U.S.C. § 951 (1970) provides in part: "A preferred mortgage shall
constitute a lien upon the mortgaged vessel in the amount of the outstanding
mortgage indebtedness secured by such vessel. Upon the default of any term or
condition of the mortgage, such lien may be enforced by the mortgagee by suit in
rem in admiralty. Original jurisdiction of all such suits is granted to the district
courts of the United States exclusively."
29. Sales may be held prior to the completion of foreclosure proceedings.
FED. R. Cir. P. E(9)(b).
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private sale, it does not specify an appraisal requirement for public
sales.2 Since Congress had explicitly provided an appraisal requirement for private sales but had not done so for public sales, the court
reasoned 3 3 that an appraisal prior to a public sale was not
compulsory. The court concluded that since the sale in the instant
case was public, prior appraisal as specified under state law was not
required. In support of this conclusion, the court cited the importance
of national uniformity to achieve the purpose 34 of the Ship Mortgage
Act of 1920, and held that additional requirements borrowed from
state law could not be imposed on a public foreclosure sale.
The instant decision effectuates the purpose of the Ship Mortgage
Act of 1920. By finding that there is no void in the statutory scheme
of foreclosure proceedings concerning the need for appraisal prior to a
public sale of the mortgaged vessel, and thereby avoiding engrafting
state law to the federal statute, the court made the foreclosure
proceeding less onerous for the investor. Ideally, the application of
federal law reduces investor uncertainty without adversely affecting
the state's interest in protecting its citizens by insuring fairness to the
mortgagor in the foreclosure sale proceeding. By resolving the vertical
choice of law problem in favor of federal law, the court, in this case of

30. 46 U.S.C. § 954(a) (1970) provides: "Upon the default of any term or
condition of a preferred mortgage upon a vessel, the mortgagee may, in addition
to all other remedies granted by this chapter, bring suit in personam in admiralty
in a district court of the United States, against the mortgagor for the amount of
the outstanding mortgage indebtedness secured by such vessel or any deficiency in
the full payment thereof."
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2004 (1970) provides that personalty sold under court order
shall be sold in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2001 (1970). 28 U.S.C. § 2001(b)
(1970) provides in part: "Before confirmation of any private sale, the court shall
appoint three disinterested persons to appraise such property...."
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1970) provides: "Any realty or interest therein sold
under any order or decree of any court of the United States shall be sold as a
whole or in separate parcels at public sale at the courthouse of the county, parish,
or city in which the greater part of the property is located, or upon the premises
or some parcel thereof located therein, as the court directs. Such sale shall be
upon such terms and conditions as the court directs."
33. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 514-15
(1963) (when Congress expressly expanded concept of competition in one
section, the Court concluded that if broad concept had been intended in another
section, Congress would have explicitly provided the language); Pena-Cabanillas v.
United States, 394 F.2d 785, 789-90 (9th Cir. 1968) (court refused to conclude
that Congress had inadvertently left out the word "intent" in one section when it
was included in several other sections).
34. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, § 9-47.
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first impression, eliminated investor uncertainty created by differences
in the laws of the various states.3 5 Since state law does not apply,
variations in the appraisal requirements in the several states do not
affect public ship mortgage foreclosure sales. Had the court accepted
the alternative of applying state law, in addition to horizontal choice
of law questions a vertical conflicts problem would be presented if the
United States were a party to the mortgage. It is now clear that federal
law applies when the United States Government is a party to the
mortgage. 6 If state law were applied to private mortgages and federal
law to government mortgages, the identity of the mortgage holder
would determine the rights of the mortgagee.37 Even though, as the
dissent points out, no federal common law of mortgages exists at
present,'3 cases involving the United States as a party to the mortgage
will provide case law in the future. The decision not to apply the state

law requirement for appraisal in a public sale, however, does present
one area of concern. The burden is on the district court to examine
carefully the foreclosure sale proceeding and insure that the proceeds
of the sale are not grossly inadequate. 39 Even though the sale is
public, the district court must determine the fairness of even
uncontested foreclosure sales in order to provide adequate protection
for the mortgagor.40
Jack F. Stringham II
35. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAW § 66 (1968).
Judge Friendly discussed the difficulty courts have in Nolan v. Transocean Air
Lines, 290 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1961).
36. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States
v. Oil Screw Ken, 275 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. La. 1967) (court applied federal law
where United States was mortgagee and sought distribution of proceeds from sale
of vessels).

37. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 17, at 592.
38. The dissent found that there was no federal law of mortgages, citing
Bergren v. Davis. Since under Louisiana law no deficiency arises from a public sale
without prior appraisal, the dissent concluded that there was no deficiency upon
which the mortgagee could sue. The dissent, citing Dantoni v. Board of Levee
Comm'rs, 227 La. 575, 80 So.2d 81 (1955), noted that Louisiana law is
incorporated into contracts made in Louisiana. The dissent reasoned that since the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 does not deny the parties the right to define their
liabilities by contract, an admiralty court cannot find a deficiency when the
contract says there is not one.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 403 F.2d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 1968);
Ghezzi v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 321 F.2d 421, 425- (9th Cir. 1963).
40. The dissent was appalled by the inequities in the instant case. The
confirmation of the foreclosure sale was not contested by the defendant. The
plaintiff has the vessels and approximately $1,000,000 worth of equipment in
addition to the deficiency judgment. See note 7 supra.
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ALIENS-IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION-RESTRICTION
MUTER ALIENS'

ACCESS

OF COM-

TO DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT BY ATTORNEY

GENERAL Is ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Appellant, an American employer 1 of alien workers who commuted daily from Mexico, brought this action against the United
States Attorney General to enjoin enforcement of Immigration and
Naturalization Regulation 211.1(b)(1), 2 which in the event of a
labor dispute suspends the informal documentation procedures used
by these employees for entering the country,3 and for a declaratory
judgment that the regulation was invalid. The Secretary of Labor had
certified that a labor dispute was in progress at appellant's place of
business, and Border Patrol officers informed appellant's alien workers
that their border crossing documents would be revoked if they
continued to work in appellant's fields.4 Appellant contended that
commuter aliens5 had been granted permanent resident alien status,6

1. Appellant is a partnership engaged in truck farming in California, and 95%
of its work force consisted of Mexicans.
2. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1972). The Attorney General promulgated this
regulation pursuant to the authority vested in him by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1972) states in part: "When the Secretary of
Labor determines and announces that a labor dispute involving a work stoppage or
lay-off of employees is in progress at a named place of employment, Form 1-151
shall be invalid when presented in lieu of an immigrant visa or reentry permit by
an alien who has departed for and seeks reentry from any foreign place and who,
prior to his departure or during his temporary absence abroad has in any manner
entered into an arrangement to return to the United States for the primary
purpose, or seeks reentry with the intention, of accepting employment at the
place where the Secretary of Labor has determined that a labor dispute exists, or
of continuing employment which commenced at such place subsequent to the
date of the Secretary of Labor's determination." Pursuant to the provisions of this
regulation, Form 1-151 (known as a "green card") is customarily used by
commuters in place of normal border crossing documents.
4. As a result of the Attorney General's enforcement of this regulation,
appellant was forced to employ less experienced and more costly domestic labor
to work in his fields.
5. Commuter aliens are aliens who have been lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, but who continue to retain their place of residence in foreign
contiguous territory while commuting to their place of employment in the United
States. See F. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
67 (1961). Commuters were given the status of permanent resident aliens by
administrative action in order to comply with the requirements of the
Immigration Act of 1924.
6. A permanent resident alien is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (1970) provides, in part, that the term
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were entitled to admission as special immigrants," and could not be
differentiated rationally from permanent resident aliens in any manner
consistent with the goals of the immigration law. The Attorney
General argued that a rational basis existed for distinguishing
commuter aliens from permanent resident aliens because commuter
aliens did not maintain their residence in the United States. In making
this distinction, the Attorney General relied upon his discretionary
power' and the immigrant screening provisions9 of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act.' 0 The district court upheld the regulation,
finding that the commuter aliens' lack of actual residence in the
United States was the determinative factor upon which the Attorney
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence" means "the status of having been
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently In the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having
changed."
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(B) (1970) defines a "special immigrant" as "an
immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a
temporary visit abroad." Because they have been previously admitted to lawful
residence in this country, special immigrants are relieved of many of the reentry
documentation requirements demanded of other immigrants pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1181(b) (1970), which states in part: "returning resident immigrants, defined in
section 1101(a)(27)(B) of this title, who are otherwise admissible may be
readmitted to the United States by the Attorney General in his discretion without
being required to obtain a passport, immigration visa, reentry permit or other
documentation." 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(1) (1972) executes this section of the code
by providing for the use of Form 1-151 ("green cards") in lieu of passports or
other documents.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970) provides in part: "The Attorney General shall
be charged with the administration and enforcement of... all ... laws relating to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens .... He shall establish such
regulations... as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the
provisions of this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (1970) gives the Attorney General
the power to admit special immigrants at his discretion under informal
documentation procedures.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970). Originally, this provision gave the Attorney
General the right to exclude any alien certified by the Secretary of Labor as
adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of domestic workers
similarly employed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1964). In 1965, however, the
emphasis was reversed and no immigrant could be admitted until it had been
certified that he would not adversely affect domestic labor conditions. Permanent
resident aliens are not subject to this regulation. See note 17 infra and
accompanying text.
10. Domestic labor unions have been concerned with alien labor control,
particularly the control of Mexican labor, as evidenced by their constant attacks
upon the commuter alien system in litigation preceeding this case. See, e.g.,
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General could rely in more stringently controlling commuter aliens.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
held, reversed. Residence outside the United States does not alter
commuter aliens' status as permanent resident aliens or special
immigrants and cannot be utilized as a means of restricting access to
the domestic labor market. Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d
745 (9th Cir. 1972).
The protection of American labor " was one of the primary
purposes of the Immigration Act of 1924. 12 Consequently, the
commuter alien was designated an immigrant under the Act. 13 In
1927, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, conscious of the
inhibitory effect 14 that this designation had on the commuter alien,
adopted a regulation that gave such aliens permanent resident alien
status. 1s In accordance with this administrative action, a commuter
alien was required to qualify under the immigration laws only on his
first entrance into the country; thereafter he would be considered a

Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell, 291 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960). Curiously, however,
labor did not seek to intervene in the instant case. The Government has responded
to labor's position by monitoring the economic impact of foreign labor along the
border areas of the Southwest. See generally Dellon, ForeignAgricultural Workers
and the Prevention of Adverse Effect, 17 LABOR L.J. 739 (1966). Equally
noteworthy has been the Attorney General's position on commuter alien status.
InGooch v. Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971),
the Attorney General argued successfully that commuter aliens were special immigrants and as such were exempt from the labor certification requirements of the
Act. This not only contradicted the thrust of Regulation 211.1(b)(1), then in
force, but was diametrically opposed to the Attorney General's contention in the
instant case.
11. See Karnutlh v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 243 (1929) (in
view of Congress' labor protection policy, commuter aliens cannot be admitted
under the "temporarily for business" category--an exempt classification--but
must be considered immigrants subject to all restrictions). Creating an administrative category for commuters, therefore, would seem to be in accord with
congressional intent.
12. Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153.
13. The Act of 1924 defined an "immigrant" as "any alien departing from
any place outside the United States destined for the United States." Act of May
26, 1924, ch. 190, § 3,43 Stat. 153.
14. As immigrants, commuters were subject, among other things, to quota
restrictions and would have to requalify each time they entered the United States.
This effectively prevented daffy commuting.
15. Immigration and Naturalization Service General Order 86 (April 1, 1927),
reprinted in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TIE UNITED STATES 490 (1942).
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permanent resident alien making a temporary visit abroad. This
artificial administrative status was an exception to the protectionist
policies of immigration legislation and was predicated upon a desire to
preserve friendly relations with Canada and Mexico. 16 Subsequent
legislation 1" significantly strengthened the safeguards of American
labor, 18 but left the 1927 regulation unaltered. The commuter alien's
status as a permanent resident alien was upheld in In re H-O-, 19 in
which the Board of Immigration Appeals decided that lack of actual
residence in the United States did not change the commuter alien's
status as a permanent resident alien. Consequently, they were entitled
to readmission to this country under the informal documentation
procedures applicable to special immigrants. This determination,
however, was overturned in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Rogers, 20
in which a federal district court concluded that a commuter alien
could not be considered a permanent resident alien. The court based
its decision upon the definition of "residence" in the Act. 21 The
Board of Immigration Appeals subsequently followed this decision, 2
but expressly limited its rulings to the facts in Amalgamated.
16. In re M-D--S- & L-G- & W-D-C--, 8 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS UNDER IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES 209 (1958) (commuter status is predicated upon maintaining friendly
relations with Canada and Mexico) [hereinafter cited as I. & N. DEC.]
17. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 183
(1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(14) (1965). The 1965 amendment places
the burden on the immigrant to show that he will not adversely affect local labor
conditions as an entry requirement.
18. Hearings on the Review of the Operation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as Amended by the Act of October 3, 1965, Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 101

(1968). It was the opinion of the Committee and the Department of Labor that
the 1965 amendment more stringently controlled alien labor flow.
19. In re H-O-, 5 I. & N. DEc. 716 (1954).
20. 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1960). The court agreed that 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(14), dealing with exclusions based upon certification of adverse effect by
the Secretary of Labor, did not apply to permanent resident aliens, but it found
that commuters were not within that class. 186 F. Supp. at 119-20. A more
ominous implication of the decision was that if commuter aliens were not
permanent resident aliens, then by definition they could not be special immigrants
entitled to informal documentation procedures. The entire commuter system was
therefore jeopardized by the Amalgamated decision.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1970) provides in part: "[T]he place of general
abode.., means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact without regard to
intent."
22. In re J-P-, 9 I. & N. DEC. 591 (1962).
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Thereafter, the Attorney General could exclude commuter aliens upon
a showing that they would adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of domestic workers similarly employed. Because of the
rising concern over the impact of foreign labor on the domestic job
market, especially in the border areas of the Southwest, 2 3 the
Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated Regulation
211.1(b)(1) in 1967. In Cermeno-Cerna v. Farrell,24 the first judicial
test of the new regulation, the Government argued that § 212(a)(14)
of the Act empowered the Attorney General to regulate commuter
aliens after they had been lawfully admitted to the United States. The
district court, although rejecting the Government's contention, upheld
the regulation. In Cermeno-Cerna, the court refined the Amalgamated
distinction between commuters and permanent resident aliens by
finding that commuter aliens had neither statutory nor constitutional
status and entered the country at the sufferance of the Attorney
General. 25 Amalgamated was repudiated in Gooch v. Clark, 26 in
which the Ninth Circuit concluded that commuter aliens had the same
status as permanent resident aliens and were unaffected by residence
across the border. 27 The Gooch court interpreted "special immigrant"
to mean a person lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and
determined that the definition referred not to the actuality of one's
residence, but to one's status under the immigration laws. 2 As a

23. See, e.g., Note, Alien Commuters in the Fields: The "Green-Card
Commuter" Under the Immigration and Naturalization Laws, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1750, 1759 (1969).
24. 291 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
25. 291 F. Supp. at 529.
26. 433 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 995 (1971).
27. The Gooch court recognized that the practical effect of Amalgamated was
the denial of informal documentation procedures to commuter aliens. Thus the
central issue, according to the majority, was whether the United States borders
should be closed to approximately 40,000 commuter aliens. In ruling that
commuter aliens should not be denied informal documentation privileges,
however, the Gooch court did not rule upon Regulation 211.1(b)(1) or consider
the policy-arguments in support of the regulation. Rather, the court dealt with the
validity of the commuter system itself in the wake of Amalgamated.
28. In a vigorous dissent Judge Wright pointed out that the state of the law in
1965, with commuter aliens regarded as special immigrants, was embodied in the
Amalgamated decision. Therefore, he concluded that inaction by Congress should
be construed as support for Amalgamated. Judge Wright also called attention to
the inconsistent positions assumed by the Service over the years concerning
commuter status. 433 F.2d at 82. Nonetheless, Judge Wright joined in invalidating
Regulation 211.1(b)(1) in the instant decision.
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result, it was unimportant whether the commuter alien lived in the
United States if he had been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States. 29
The court in the instant case sought a rational relationship
between the regulation and its parent statute. The court noted that
the regulation created both a distinction between commuter aliens
who worked for an employer involved in a labor dispute and those
who did not and a distinction between the commuter and the
permanent resident alien; however, the court found neither distinction
rationally related to the administration of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. 3 Applying the rationale of Gooch, 31 the court
determined that commuters were special immigrants and therefore
exempt from the labor certification provisions of § 212(a)(14) of the
Act. In concluding that neither the Act nor its legislative history
implied that the informal admission procedures available to special
immigrants could be used by the Attorney General to intervene in
domestic labor disputes, 32 the court rejected the Attorney General's
contention that his discretionary power allowed him to differentiate
between commuters and permanent resident aliens 3 3 and held that
commuter alien status was unaffected by lack of residence in the
United States. 31

In the instant case the Ninth Circuit was presented with a split of
judicial opinion regarding the legitimacy of the commuter alien's
administrative status as a permanent resident alien. This split had
created uncertainty about the inclusion of commuter aliens within the
class of special immigrants who were exempt from most immigration
requirements. A forthright declaration by the instant court was
needed to resolve prior judicial disagreement and to secure the
commuter alien's rights in a period of rising opposition. 31 Unfortunately, the court chose instead to limit its opinion to a rebuttal of the
29. The policy of protecting alien rights evidenced in Gooch was subsequently
reinforced by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (a

state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens or denies benefits to
aliens who have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years
violates the equal protection clause).
30. See Fook Hong Mak v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 435 F.2d
728 (2d Cir. 1970) (regulation must be upheld if it is founded on considerations
rationally related to the statute being administered).
31. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
32. 457 F.2d at 748.

33. 457 F.2d at 749.
34. 457 F.2d at 749.

35. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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Government's case; 3 6 the decision was merely a logical extension of
its opinion in Gooch. " Rather than expand the commuter alien's
rights, the Ninth Circuit solidified existing rights that had an uncertain
base and that had been compromised by previous court decisions. 3
The instant decision might serve as a basis for future expansion of
commuter alien rights, 11 but it is not certain that this decision will
halt efforts to restrict the flow of alien workers. The intensity of
future opposition to commuter labor will depend primarily upon the
level of unemployment in those areas affected by commuter aliens and
by the success of unionization efforts in the industries affected by
commuter aliens. It is unlikely that the Immigration Service will be
able to respond effectively to this opposition because its ability to act
in the commuter alien field has been severely circumscribed by the
court in the instant case. It will be difficult for the Service to direct
any future action toward commuter aliens because the instant decision
has made commuter aliens equivalent to permanent resident aliens
who actually reside in the United States. Consequently, future
attempts to control commuters will have to apply to resident aliens as
well. 40 The instant decision might result in a greater emphasis on the
screening provisions of § 212(a)(14) of the Act, 4 causing in turn
more rigorous screening of other immigrants in order to accommodate
domestic opposition to foreign labor. The absence of labor intervention in the instant case may reflect gains made in unionizing farm
workers and a concomitant decline in opposition to foreign labor, but
it more likely indicates that the fight will be taken to another

36. Several arguments were available to the court. The constitutional rights of
permanent resident aliens had been widened by such cases as Graham v.
Richardson. In considering whether the commuter was to share in these expanded
rights, the court could have pointed to the fact that the commuter was first given
permanent resident alien status in order to comply with the 1924 Act, that this
scheme was noted by Congress in the 1952 reenactment, that Congress has
consistently refused to alter the commuter system despite its efforts to restrict
foreign labor competition, and that the commuter's status was of long standing.
37. The court in Gooch upheld the use of Form 1-151 and further held that
commuter aliens were special immigrants and thus exempt from the labor
certification provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970).
38. See notes 20 & 24 supra.
39. See note 29 supra.
40. The remedies available to the Attorney General are thus diminished
because permanent resident aliens are exempt from most restrictions contained
in the Act.
41. This section was relied upon by Congress as the primary vehicle for
controlling immigration flow. See note 18 supra.
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forum--the Congress. Because of Amalgamated, labor probably felt
little need for a congressional declaration concerning commuter aliens
when the revisions to the Immigration Act were enacted in 1965.
Gooch and the instant decision may now cause labor unions to
reexamine the need for congressional action. Nevertheless, Congress
may continue its reluctance to legislate in this area because such
action would affect directly our relations with Canada and Mexico. 42
Because foreign relations is within the power of the Executive,
Congress is unlikely to act in the absence of Executive leadership.
Thus while the immediate future for commuter aliens appears secure,
the quest for a congressional declaration on commuter alien status
probably will be intensified. In the long run, this may be the only
satisfactory way to secure permanently the commuter alien's position
in American society.
Alan Marchisotto

42. Although no aspect of immigration law can be divorced from foreign
policy, the commuter problem, more than any other, has a direct link to our
relations with foreign states. The commuter system was created in order to
maintain friendly relations with Canada and Mexico. See note 16 supra.
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EXTRADITION-PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALTY-SPECIALTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE PROSECUTION FOR SIMILAR OFFENSE WHEN ASYLUM NATION
WOULD NOT CONSIDER IT A BREACH OF FAITH

Appellants,' citizens of France, were extradited to the United
States in October of 1971 as an act of comity by the Italian
Government.2 The extradition was based on an indictment issued by a
federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts, 3 which charged
appellants with conspiring to import heroin into the United States
from September of 1968 through April of 1969. 4 After their arrival in
Massachusetts, appellants were released on bail, but shortly thereafter
were indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New
York for conspiring to violate the narcotics laws between January of
1. Charles Laurent Fiocconi and Jean Claude Kella.
2. The United States Embassy in Rome requested extradition in September of
1970 after Interpol discovered appellants in an Italian town. Appellants could not

be extradited by operation of treaty since narcotics crimes are not among the
offenses listed in the extradition convention with Italy. See Convention with the
King of Italy for the Surrender of Criminals, March 23, 1868, 15 Stat. 629 (1868),
T.S. No. 174. In requesting extradition as an act of comity, the Embassy
emphasized that the offense for which extradition was requested was also a crime
under Italian law and that drug traffic was strongly condemned by public opinion.
Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 339 F. Supp. 1242, 1244
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). Extradition procedure is prescribed by treaty, and there is little
uniformity. The usual procedure, however, is initiated by the filing of a
requisition for extradition by the requesting nation and includes a hearing in the
asylum nation to determine if there are sufficient grounds for a trial of the
accused. See generally

HARVARD

RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

Extradition, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 158-213 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as
HARVARD RESEARCH]. In the United States, extradition is a federal
prerogative which cannot be granted unless provided by treaty. Factor v.

Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933). The United States, therefore, seldom
requests extradition not under treaty, since it cannot reciprocate. Wise, Some
Problems of Extradition, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 709, 714 (1969). For United States
extradition procedure see 18 U.S.C. § § 3181-95 (1970).
3. The indictment and arrest warrants issued by the District Court of
Massachusetts were among the papers presented to the Italian Government. The
extradition order issued by a Florence court directed appellants' surrender "so

that they can be subjected to judgment according to the writ of indictment
against them formulated by the Grand Jury of the District Court of Appeals of
Massachusetts [sic] dated the 20th of November, 1969.... ." 462 F.2d at 477.
4. Importation of heroin was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). Although
§ 174 was repealed effective May 1, 1971, the repealer contained a saving
provision for violations committed prior to May 1, 1971. Pub. L. No. 91-513, §
1103(a) (Oct. 27, 1970).
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1970 and January of 1972, and for receiving, concealing and selling
heroin.5 Following their detention on the New York charges,
appellants petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that
their prosecution would be in violation of the principle of specialty6
constituting a breach of faith with Italy. The district court denied the
petition, holding that unless extradition is under treaty,' such a
breach of faith is not judicially cognizable, but is a matter for the
executive. 8 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, affirmed on separate grounds. Violations of the
principle of specialty in extraditions not under treaty are judicially
cognizable, but the principle does not preclude prosecution where the
asylum nation would not consider it a breach of faith. Fiocconi v.

5. The grand jury in the Southern District of New York originally indicted
appellants for only the substantive crimes of receiving, concealing and selling
heroin. While appellants' petition for a writ of habeas corpus was pending with the
district court, a superseding indictment was issued that added the conspiracy
charges. 462 F.2d at 477.
6. The principle of specialty provides that an extraditee cannot be prosecuted
for an offense other than that for which he was surrendered until he has had a
reasonable time to leave the prosecuting country. HARVARD

RESEARCH,

supra

note 2, at 213-17. Although the principle is generally recognized, it has been
suggested that the right of the asylum nation to waive the principle indicates that

it is not a rule of international law, but merely a rule of comity. See 2 D.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 732-33 (2d ed. 1970). Specialty is related
to the principle that political crimes are not extraditable: specialty prevents a

O'CONNELL,

requesting nation from prosecuting an extraditee for his opposition to the
government after obtaining his extradition for another offense. See Bassiouni,
International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice
and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733, 749 (1969).

7. "Extradition under treaty" denotes extradition demanded of the asylum
nation on the authority of a treaty between the requesting and asylum nations.
"Extradition under comity" denotes extradition requested of the asylum nation
on the basis of international comity.
8. Fiocconi v. Attorney General of the United States, 339 F. Supp. 1242
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The district court declared that the obligation to refrain from

prosecution of extraditees for an offense other than that for which they were
extradited is an obligation imposed only by treaty. According to the court, an
extraditee unprotected by treaty is to be treated like a defendant brought before

the court in violation of international law, who may be prosecuted in spite of that
violation. See United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). Consequently,

the court allowed an extraditee surrendered by a nation as an act of comity no
immunity from prosecution for any crime for which he has been properly
indicted. 339 F. Supp. at 1246-47.
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Attorney General of the United States, 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972),
petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1972) (No.
332).
In accordance with the concept of territorial sovereignty,9 modern
international law recognizes no duty to extradite."0 Since extradition
is therefore a voluntary act of good faith,"
nations have long
recognized the principle of specialty-a duty to refrain from prosecuting an extraditee for an offense other than that for which he was
3
2
surrendered by the asylum nation.' In United States v. Rauscher,1
the Supreme Court provided the extraditee with a judicial remedy for

9. A nation has unrestricted authority over the property and persons within
its borders; it cannot legally be forced to surrender a person to whom it has
chosen to provide asylum, unless it has agreed to do so by treaty. See generally 1
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 123, 124 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955).
10. Grotius and other early writers stated that a nation has the duty either to
punish the offender or to deliver him to the requesting nation for punishment.
United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 221 (2d Cir. 1934);
Bassiouni, supra note 6, at 734. Modern international law, however, recognizes no
such duty. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at § 327. Although the surrender of
criminals by one nation to another was practiced even in the ancient world, these
transfers were effected as a matter of comity. Extradition agreements, however,
have become common within the last two centuries. The first United States
extradition treaty of consequence was the Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Great
Britain, August 9, 1842, art. X, 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119. See generally
HARVARD RESEARCH,supra note 2, at 32-51.

11. Extradition, whether under treaty or comity, is a voluntary act since a
nation is under no duty either to enter into an extradition agreement or to
surrender an extraditee as an act of comity. See United States ex rel. Donnelly v.
Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1934); OPPENHEIM,Supra note 9, at § 327.
12. See, e.g., HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 213.

13. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). In Rauscher, petitioner was extradited to the
United States under treaty with Great Britain, on charges of murder on the high
seas. Upon extradition, he was tried and convicted on the lesser charge of
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
although the treaty with Great Britain did not contain a "specialty clause" the
principle must nonetheless be upheld. The Court expressed the classic justification
for the principle of specialty: "[I] t can hardly be supposed that a government
which was under no treaty obligation nor any absolute obligation of public duty
to seize a person who had found an asylum within its bosom and turn him over to
another country for trial, would be willing to do this, unless a case was made of
some specific offense of a character which justified the government in depriving
the party of his asylum. It is unreasonable that the country of the asylum should
be expected to deliver up such person to be dealt with by the demanding
government without any limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its prosecution of
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the breach of international good faith by depriving United States
courts of jurisdiction to prosecute in violation of specialty, 14 even
though the applicable treaty did not express the principle. The
traditional test applied in order to determine if specialty has been
accorded is whether the unlawful act represented to the asylum nation
is the act for which the accused is ultimately prosecuted."5 This test
was altered, however, in United States v. Paroutian,'6 in which the
Second Circuit ruled that the test should be whether the asylum
nation would consider the offense supporting prosecution as "sepathe party." 119 U.S. at 419. Rauscher settled a long dispute in this country over
the principle of specialty and its application to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
with Great Britain. Compare United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 879 (No.
15,573) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1876) (held that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty does not
require that prosecution of extraditees under that treaty comply with the
principle of specialty) with Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697
(1878) (held that the weight of authority and a fair construction of the treaty
preclude prosecution in violation of specialty). For an exhaustive discussion of the
specialty issue in the Lawrence case see Lawrence, The Extradition Treaty, 14
ALBANY L. J. 85 (1876), 15 ALBANY L. J. 224 (1877) and 16 ALBANY L. J.
361 (1878). The Rauscher decision actually conflicted with the view taken at one
time by the United States Department of State. In 1876, Great Britain proposed
as a condition to the surrender of one Winslow a stipulation that the United States
would prosecute him only for the offense presented to British authorities. The
State Department refused to so stipulate and threatened to regard the AngloAmerican treaty as abrogated if the British persisted. 2 F. WHARTON, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 760, 769 (2d ed. 1887); see 15 Op. ATT'Y GEN.
514 (1875).
14. Chief Justice Waite, dissenting, argued not against the principle of
specialty, but merely against the provision of a judicial remedy for its violation.
119 U.S. at 434.
15. "In deciding whether the indictment charges the same offense for which
the defendants were extradited, the acts of the defendants alleged in the two
proceedings must be considered. It is not a question of names." Greene v. United
States, 154 F. 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1907) (specialty not violated by indictment for
"conspiracy with an agent to defraud" after extradition for "participation in
fraud by an agent or trustee"); cf. Bryant v. United States, 167 U.S. 104, 108
(1897) ("So long as the prisoner is tried upon the facts which appeared in
evidence before the [extradition] commissioner, and upon ... one of the charges
for which he is surrendered, it is immaterial whether the indictment against him
shall contain counts for forgery, larceny or embezzlement"). See also Collins v.
Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922) ("cheating" held not different offense from
"obtaining property under false pretenses").
16. 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). Paroutian was extradited from Lebanon on
the basis of an indictment issued in the Southern District of New York charging
conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964) (importation of heroin). He was
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rate." The judicial remedy available to extraditees under treaty is an
exception to the general rule of criminal jurisdiction that a court may
try a defendant properly indicted for any crime committed within the
court's jurisdiction. 1 7 Normally, violations of international law
attending criminal prosecution confer no immunity from prosecution
upon the defendant, but are matters handled by the executive upon
protest of the offended sovereign. 8 Moreover, the mere existence of
a treaty confers no right to asylum on the defendant; rights accrue to
his benefit only when the treaty is called into effect.' 9 The general
rule was applied to the extreme in Ker v. Illinois," in which the
Supreme Court refused to disturb the conviction of a defendant
convicted, however, on an indictment in the Eastern District of New York that
added counts for receipt and concealment of heroin to the conspiracy charge. The
court concluded that Lebanon would not consider that Paroutian had been
convicted for an offense other than the extradition offense, but reversed the
conviction on other grounds.
17. United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd,
244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). Sobell, convicted for
conspiracy to commit espionage as a co-defendant of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,
argued that the court was without jurisdiction to try him since he was seized in
Mexico by Mexican police, forcibly removed to the United States border, and
turned over to United States agents. In rejecting Sobell's claim, the court
distinguished the Rauscher remedy as an exception to the general criminal rule.
18. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); United States v. Sobell, 142 F.
Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
873 (1957). See also United States v. Unverzagt, 299 F. 1015, 1016-17 (W.D.
Wash. 1924), aff'd sub. nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 269 U.S. 566 (1925) (abduction of accused from British Columbia by
purported American agents does not deprive United States court of jurisdiction to
try accused).
19. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442 (1886). Petitioner in Ker argued that
the existence of an extradition treaty with Peru prevented the United States from
removing him by any method other than extradition under treaty. In dismissing
petitioner's argument, Justice Miller said that the existence of the treaty conferred
no right of asylum in Peru.
20. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinions in Ker and
Rauscher, decided on the same day. In Ker, a warrant requesting extradition of
petitioner from Peru was issued by the President to one Julian, who took the
necessary papers to Lima. After his arrival in Lima, however, Julian apparently
never presented the warrant to Peruvian authorities but simply kidnapped
petitioner and forcibly removed him to Illinois. See note 19 supra. A unanimous
Court reaffirmed Ker in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), commenting:
"This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v. Illinois ....

No

persuasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They
rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in
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kidnapped from Lima, Peru by American agents and forcibly returned
to Illinois for trial.
In the instant case a unanimous court found that the denial of
jurisdiction decreed in Rauscher does not depend upon a governing
treaty, but is a rule of United States foreign relations law that provides
a remedy both to extraditees surrendered as an act of comity and to
those demanded under treaty."' The court adopted the rationale of
the Paroutian case, which determined that the purpose of the
Rauscher remedy is to prevent United States violations of international obligations. The court then formulated its own test: specialty
will be satisfied if the asylum nation would not regard prosecution of
the extraditee as a breach of faith.2 2 The court conceded that its
application of this test required a step beyond Paroutian, since the
indictment supporting prosecution in the instant case alleged a
conspiracy one to three years subsequent to the conspiracy alleged in
the extradition request.2 3 Nevertheless, the court opined that Italy
would not deem prosecution for the subsequent offense to be a breach
of faith, since the extradition offense was of the same character as
that supporting prosecution.2 4
The part of the decision that extends the Rauscher remedy to
extraditees surrendered as a matter of comity is sound for at least two
court is convicted of a crime after having been fairly apprized of the charges
against him and after a fair trial in accordance with constitutional procedural
safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial
against his will." 342 U.S. at 522 (Black, J.).
21. The court reasoned that Rauscher's conviction could not have violated the
extradition treaty with Great Britain since the treaty did not refer to the principle
of specialty. See note 13 supra. Rauscher's conviction, the court said, violated
United States foreign relations law "devised by the courts to implement the
treaty." It is therefore not necessary, the court felt, that the extradition be under
treaty for the judicial remedy created in Rauscher to apply. 462 F.2d at 479-80;
cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 3, Comment (h) (1965) ("The domestic law of a state may

provide a remedy in its courts to a person who has been injured by a violation of a
rule of international law.").
22. 462 F.2d at 480.
23. See note 31 infra.
24. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, characterized the transfer from
Massachusetts to New York as a "problem of venue, a 'technical refinement of
local law' with which Italy is scarcely concerned." The court also found support
in that the extradition treaty with Italy does not prohibit prosecution of an
extraditee for any offense committed before his extradition, as do some treaties,
but prohibits only prosecution for crimes committed before that for which
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reasons. First, the Ker v.
court 2 s

llinois rationale utilized by the district

has been applied only in those cases in which a violation of

territorial sovereignty had occurred.2 6 Application of Ker in extradition cases would discourage extradition since a protest by the
asylum nation would not necessarily prevent a United States court
from prosecuting the extraditee.2 7 In addition, the principle of
specialty could be completely abrogated if political considerations
prevented the asylum nation's protest. 28 Secondly, the reasons for
providing a judicial remedy for extraditees under treaty apply equally
well to those surrendered under comity. If, as the court in the instant
case indicates, the remedy is only to prevent the United States from
injuring international relations, it makes no difference that a treaty
was not effectuated. A breach of comity would injure foreign relations
no less than the breach of a treaty obligation; neither breach would be
conducive to the granting of future extraditions by the asylum nation.
If, in addition to the avoidance of United States violations of
international obligations, the remedy provided in Rauscher is to
protect the extraditee from indiscriminate prosecution,2 9 that protec-

extradition is requested. The court inferred that the treaty thus allows
prosecution for a crime committed before extradition, so long as the offense was
not antecedent to the offense for which the extraditee was returned, and said that
this more liberal provision was an indication of Italy's attitude toward prosecution
of extraditees.
25. See note 8 supra.
26. See, e.g., The Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815) (United States
court held not deprived of jurisdiction over vessel by its seizure in violation of
international law); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
27. In a case involving a crime such as treason or espionage, the executive
might well assign greater importance to the prosecution of the accused than to the
maintenance of the good will of the asylum nation. Cf. United States v. Sobell,
142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 873 (1957).
28. "Given the complexity and delicacy of present-day international relations,
and the often overwhelming multiple preoccupations of state departments, foreign
offices and the other governmental agencies concerned, states must be left a
measure of discretion as to whether and to what extent to pursue the interests of
nationals who may have suffered injury abroad. There may well be situations
where a government may feel disinclined to endanger relations with another state,
which may be of strategic or political significance, in order to protect a
national...." W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (1964).
29. The instant court recognized that the principle of specialty reflects the
international belief that extraditees should not be indiscriminately prosecuted,
especially for political crimes. 462 F.2d at 481.
Vol. 6-No. 1

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

tion is needed whether the extradition occurs by treaty or under
comity. After extending the remedy provided by Rauscher, however,
the instant court adopted a test of whether specialty has been satisfied
that is in derogation of both specialty and the Rauscher remedy.
Unless the asylum nation affirmatively protests,3" the new test
effectively allows an extraditee to be prosecuted for an offense clearly
different from that for which he was extradited.3 1 The result in the
instant case, however, is subject to a more fundamental criticism. In
addition to preventing violations of international obligations by the
executive, the Rauscher remedy afforded extraditees basic Constitutional guarantees--notice of the charges on which they were to be
prosecuted.3" The instant decision, which sanctions the prosecution
of extraditees for offenses not specified to the asylum nation, denies
the accused notice of the charge against which he must ultimately
defend. The possible result is the very thing that the principle of
specialty was designed to prevent-indiscriminate prosecution by the

30. As noted earlier, a nation may be prevented from protesting by political
considerations. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
31. It is not clear whether the instant court felt that the prosecution of
appellants for the subsequent conspiracy and substantive crimes would have met
the traditional test requiring that the accused be prosecuted for the same act for
which he was extradited. See note 15 supra. While quoting Paroutianto the effect
that the test should not depend upon "some technical refinement of local law,"
the court admitted that it was going beyond Paroutian by finding specialty
satisfied. There is little authority on whether prosecution for a substantive crime
following extradition on a charge of conspiracy to commit that crime violates
specialty. Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir. 1907), held that specialty
was not violated by an indictment for "conspiracy with an agent to defraud"
following extradition for "participation in fraud by an agent or trustee." 154 F.
at 406. The instant case also demonstrates the difficulty of applying the "same
act" standard to conspiracy. A conspiracy allegedly existed in the instant case
from 1968 until 1972. The entire conspiracy related to the importation of heroin;
the "same act" standard, therefore, might be met. Nevertheless, it may be
unreasonable to conclude that a 1968 conspiracy is the same act as one occurring
in 1971.
32. U.S. CONST., amend. V. Due process includes notice of the specific
charge against the accused and an opportunity to contest the charges against him.
See, e.g., Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) ("No principle of procedural

due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific
charge... [is] among the constitutional rights of every accused"); cf. Galpin v.
Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69 (1873) ("[N]o one shall be personally
bound until he has had his day in court.., and has been afforded an opportunity
to be heard."). But ef. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See note 20 supra.
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requesting nation.3 3 Although the individual traditionally has not
been considered the subject of international law,34 the belief that
international law should concern itself with the individual is growing,
and some writers have argued for a revised international law that
would apply directly to individuals.3" This court's view that compliance with specialty depends upon the reaction of the asylum nation to
the prosecution is in accordance with traditional international law, but
it is clearly contrary to modern concern for individual rights. This
decision affords little protection to the individual, for the extraditee
must depend upon the willingness and ability of the asylum nation to
oppose his prosecution in violation of specialty. If the extraditee is
not a national of the asylum nation, protest by that state to the
prosecuting nation is especially unlikely. 36 An argument against the
direct application of international law to individuals is that major

33. Without notice of the charge on which he is eventually to be prosecuted,
the accused naturally cannot defend against his extradition on that charge. After
his extradition to the United States, the accused has no protection against
prosecution on a separate charge under the holding of the instant case. Even if the
asylum nation protests and prosecution is halted, the extraditee has already been
subjected to the manifest inconvenience of removal and detention.
34. "[T] he Law of Nations is primarily a law for the international conduct of
States, and not of their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of the rights and duties
arising from the Law of Nations are States solely and exclusively. An individual
human being, such as an alien or an ambassador, for example, is not directly a
subject of International Law. Therefore, all rights which might necessarily have to
be granted to an individual human being according to the Law of Nations are not,
as a rule, international rights, but rights granted by Municipal Law in accordance
with a duty imposed upon the State concerned by International Law."
OPPENKEIM, supra note 9, at 19. Wolfgang Friedmann wrote that "[U]ntil
recently, during by far the greater part of the development of modern
international law, the individual, the 'common man' was essentially a pawn of
international policy and diplomacy." FRIEDMANN, supra note 28, at 40.
35. One manifestation of this increased international concern for individual
rights is the drafting of covenants of human rights like the 1948 United Nations
Declaration of Human Rights. See, FRIEDMANN, supra note 28, at 40. Among
the advocates of an individual international law is Judge Philip Jessup, who made
the direct application of international law to the individual one of two "keystones
of a revised international legal order." P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 2 (1950). For a complete discussion of the status of the individual
in international law see Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations,
63 L.Q. REv. 438 (1947) and 64 L.Q. REV. 97 (1948). Lauterpacht concludes
that recognition of the individual as the true subject of the law of nations is not
contrary to the "true purpose" of international law. 64 L.Q. Rxv. at 119.
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structural and legal changes would be necessary to effect that
application." In the instant case, however, no change in structure or
law was necessary to effect protection of the individual from
indiscriminate extradition and prosecution. Rauscher provided adequate protection by denying United States courts jurisdiction to
prosecute extraditees for offenses other than that for which they were
surrendered. By undermining the Rauscher remedy, the Fiocconi
court has missed an opportunity to promote the protection of
international individual rights.
James T. Campbell

36. The instant case is a good example. Appellants were not Italian nationals
and were carrying false passports when arrested in Italy. It seems highly unlikely
that extraditees like appellants would receive much protection from the asylum
nation. It is likely that the extraditee will not be a national of the asylum nation
since many countries refuse to extradite their own citizens. See HARVARD
RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 123-37.
37. For a discussion of several possible structural changes, including a world
parliament, see JEssup, supra note 35, at 16-18. See also FRIEDMANN, supra
note 28, at 234-42.
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JURISDICTION-FoRuM SELECTION CLAUSES-UNITED STATES COURTS
WILL

ENFORCE

FORUM

SELECTION

CLAUSES

IN

INTERNATIONAL

TOWAGE CONTRACTS ABSENT EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Petitioner,' a German corporation, entered into an international
towage contract with respondent,' an American corporation, to tow a
seagoing oil drilling rig3 from Louisiana to Italy. The provisions of
the contract included a forum selection clause, 4 which stipulated that
all litigation concerning the contract would be resolved before the
High Court of Justice in London, and two clauses' that purported to
release petitioner from liability for damages to the tow. A severe
storm during the voyage caused extensive damage to the rig and
respondent instructed petitioner's tug6 to tow the rig to the nearest
port, Tampa, Florida. Ignoring the forum selection clause, respondent
commenced a suit in admiralty in the federal district court at Tampa
against petitioner in personam and the tug in rem seeking damages for
negligent towage and breach of contract. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the action for lack of jurisdiction and on grounds of forum non
conveniens; the court took these motions under advisement. 7 Due to
statutory time limits, however, petitioner was compelled to file a
limitation proceeding' in the same court. Respondent filed its claim in

1. Unterweser Reederei, G.m.b.H.
2. Zapata Off-Shore Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Houston.
3. The Chaparral.
4. "Any dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice."
Presumably the parties meant the High Court of Justice located in London.
5. "1. ... [Unterweser and its] masters and crews are not responsible for
defaults and/or errors in the navigation of the tow.
"2 .... (b) Damages suffered by the towed object are in any case for account of its Owners." The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 3 n.2 (1972).
6. The MIS Bremen.
7. Oral argument to dismiss was heard on April 29, 1968, but no ruling was
given until July 29, 1968-after Unterweser had filed its limitation proceeding for
which the statute of limitations would have run July 8, 1968.
8. Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability, 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) provides:
"The vessel owner, within six months after a claimant shall have given to or filed
with such owner written notice of a claim, may petition a district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within the
provisions of this chapter ....Upon compliance with the requirements of this
section all claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the matter in
question shall cease."
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the limitation proceeding and petitioner sought a stay of litigation in
order to allow the English court, which was concurrently hearing the
0
controversy, to resolve the dispute. 9 The district court" found the
equitable considerations presented by petitioner to be unpersuasive
and denied the stay. 1 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
relying on Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa 12 for the
proposition that an agreement attempting to oust the court of
13
affirmjurisdiction is violative of public policy and unenforceable,'
15
4
The
and upon rehearing en banc.
ed, both in a three judge panel
court of appeals concluded also that the district court had not abused
its discretion in denying the stay on the basis of forum non conveniens.'6 On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court,
9. After respondent had initiated the admiralty action in the district court at
Tampa, petitioner brought an action on the contract in the High Court of Justice
in London, England. Ex parte leave was granted to serve notice of the English writ
in the United States and respondent's motion to set aside service was rejected.
After Unterweser filed its limitation proceeding in the federal district court, the
English Court of Appeals affirmed the prima facie policy of the English courts to
hold parties to their bargains, absent the showing of strong reason to the contrary.
UnterweserReederei G.m.b.H. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ("The Chaparral"), [1968]
2 Lloyd's Rep. 158.
10. The court relied in part on A/S J. Ludwig Mowickles Rederi, 268 F. Supp.
682 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (refusal to grant injunction against shipowner's attempt to
amend limitation petition in which owner of second ship in collision was
inadvertently omitted based on facts of case and not lack of power to enjoin).
11. 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
12. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
359 U.S. 180 (1959).
13. The court also noted that the exculpatory clause, apparently unenforceable in United States courts as violative of public policy, would probably be
enforced in England according to the uncontroverted opinion of English maritime
expert F.D. Bateson. 428 F.2d at 895.
14. In re Unterweser Reederei, G.m.b.H., 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
15. 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
16. The general rule concerning the doctrine of forum non conveniens requires
the party seeking a transfer to justify its application. The district court incorrectly
applied this rule by considering the forum clause one of the considerations in
determining the balance of convenience and by relying on a case not involving a
selection clause: "[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1946). Judge Wisdom's dissent, noting this error, cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 80, comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1957): "[w] hen a forum clause is involved our standard should be not to
disturb the contractual choice of forum unless 'the forum chosen by the parties
would be a seriously inconvenient one for the trial of the particular action.' "428
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held, judgment vacated and case remanded. United States courts will
enforce forum selection clauses in international towage contracts in
the absence of unforseeable and extreme hardships that would
effectively deprive the resisting party of his day in court. The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
Traditionally, United States courts have treated forum selection
clauses" -- attempts by the parties to confer jurisdiction on a
particular court-with hostility. Comparatively, the civil law systems
divide forum selection clauses into two categories-prorogation clauses,
in which a particular court is selected by the parties to hear any disputes that arise, and derogation clauses, in which the parties seek to exclude a particular court. Both have become acceptable internationally;
Austria, Belgium, France and Switzerland are among the countries that

F.2d at 910. As petitioner argued, forum non conveniens is a doctrine applied
after the fact-when a dispute has developed and litigation is in process; therefore
it cannot logically be applied to test the reasonableness of a forum contracted for
in advance. Nonetheless, the appellate court determined the clause in question
unreasonable, curiously citing Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966) (forum clauses prima facie valid not to be tested by
application of forum non conveniens). The factors the courts have considered in
determining the validity of a forum selection clause are: (a) Whether the rights of
the resisting party will be substantially diminished if compelled to litigate in the
foreign forum. See Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit's & Co.'s Internationale, 154
F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (towage contract retained because plaintiff
deprived of remedy in foreign forum); Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American
Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955) (rights not significantly affected, case
declined); (b) Relative availability of testimony and evidence between forums.
Hawaii Credit Card Corp. v. Continental Credit Card Corp., 290 F. Supp.
848 (D. Hawaii 1968) (most evidence in noncontract forum, jurisdiction
retained); (c) The citizenship of the parties and the nationality of the parties
involved. Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
684 (1950) (suit by citizen against foreigner invokes different considerations than
suit between foreigners); (d) Relative degree of contacts with the subject matter
of the litigation. Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d
990 (2d Cir. 1951); (e) Whether or not the contract is executory. Win. H. Muller
& Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955); (f) Whether
or not the contract was procured through fraud or overreaching; and (g) Whether
the foreign forum would accept the case and decide the dispute.
17. "The common law has no term of art to label an exclusive forum
agreement. The civilians have two serviceable terms. Considered from the point of
view of the state in which the parties have agreed to bring their litigation, it is
called a prorogation agreement. From the view of the states in which the parties
have agreed not to litigate, it is a derogation agreement." Perillo, Selected Forum
Agreements in Western Europe, 13 AM. J. COMp. L. 162 (1964).
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recognize the forum selected by the parties, subject to varying notions
of public policy. Such clauses in civil or commercial contracts generally have been upheld, although suits concerning domestic relations and
immovable objects within a state's boundaries normally are exceptions. 8
In early state and federal cases in the United States, however, agreements of both types were characterized as either unjustifiable attempts
by the contracting parties to oust the courts of jurisdiction or unenforceable efforts to circumvent public policy.' 9 Despite considerable
continued acceptance of this attitude, contrary decisions upholding the
validity of reasonable forum selection clauses have increased in frequency since 1900.20 By 1949 the hostility toward choice of forum clauses
had been eroded to the extent that Judge Hand stated he knew of no

18. Perillo, supra note 17. See generally Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of
Forum: ProrogationAgreements, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414 (1961). A recent
English case, The Eleftheria, recognized the selected forum despite the fact that a
preponderance of the evidence was situated in England, primarily due to the
substantive difference in Greek law upon which the parties had undoubtedly
relied in arriving at their bargain. [1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 237 (in rem action by
cargo owners relegated to Greek courts). Contra, The Fehmarn, [1958] 1 W.L.R.
159 (C.A.) (jurisdiction assumed despite contractual agreement to litigate in a
foreign court, primarily due to location of evidence).
19. See, e.g., Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856)
(early state rejection of selection clauses couched in historical terms); accord,
Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 233 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678
(1916). The federal courts have evidenced similar antipathy. See, e.g., Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877) (reaffirming prior decision that
agreements precluding recourse to the courts of the United States were void as
against public policy). For an excellent discussion of these and other cases see
Hay, International Versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the United States, 35
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT

FUR AuSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES

PRIVATRECHT 430 (1971).

20. A 1903 state decision enforced a contractually selected forum between
two aliens. Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903). More
recently several federal cases have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Cerro De
Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Peruvian bill of lading selecting Norwegian courts honored by dismissal of United
States proceedings). Those instances in which forum selection clauses have been
rejected involved either adhesion contracts attempting to avoid a particular forum,
see, e.g., Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Burnett, 188 Ark. 491, 66 S.W.2d 637 (1933);
Parker v. Krauss Co., 157 Misc. 667, 284 N.Y.S. 478 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (derogation
by Louisiana department store of Louisiana courts in conflict arising from
standardized sales contract), or contracts in which the American citizenship of the
parties made the selection of a foreign forum suspect, see Kuhnhold v. Compagnie
G~n~rale Transatlantique, 251 F. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
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"absolute taboo" against "reasonable""
forum selection provisions.2 2 The Supreme Court's increasing willingness to honor choice
of forum and its recognition of the power of individuals to consent, in
advance, to litigate in a specific forum were most recently evidenced
in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.23 In admiralty, the
erosion of hostility to forum selection clauses followed a similar path.
Early cases considered that the relegation of United States citizens to
foreign forums was contrary to public policy, especially in cases
involving adhesion contracts. 4 Frequently associated with adhesion
contracts were the equally disfavored exculpatory clauses, which were
held to be against public policy and void in towage contracts in Bisso
v. Inland Waterways Corp."5 Eventually, however, Judge Hand's
"reasonableness" test was applied to an admiralty case in Wm. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Lines Ltd.,2 6 in which the Second
Circuit concluded that, unless unreasonable, a forum clause in an
international contract should be enforced. Subsequently, in Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg,17 the Second Circuit overruled Muller in part
and held forum selection clauses unenforceable when the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act,2" which prohibited such clauses, was applicable.
Prior to Indussa, the Fifth Circuit had recognized a prorogation
agreement in Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa,2 9 and
reversed a district court that had followed Muller. Apparently, the

21. Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 209 A.2d
810 (1965).
22. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949).
23. 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The impact of this holding is restricted because the
issue was whether the state court had jurisdiction, not whether other courts with
concurrent jurisdiction should decline to exercise jurisdiction.
24. Insurance cases are typical. See generally Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1060
(1937).
25. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
26. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955) (Swedish courts and law selected in bill of
lading). A number of cases followed Muller in treating the choice of forum clause
as prima facie enforceable. See, e.g., Pakhuismeesteren S.A. v. S.S. Goettingen,
225 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (exclusive jurisdiction of German courts
honored); Takemura & Co. v. S.S. Tsuneshima Maru, 197 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y.
1961) (exclusive jurisdiction of Japanese courts honored).
27. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
28. 46 U.S.C. § § 1300-15 (1970) [hereinafter COGSA].
29. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958). It is interesting to note that the court made
little reference to the fact that COGSA was applicable to the contract. "The bills
of lading [in an international shipping contract] provided for exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of Genoa. The libellants brought actions in rem against the
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Fifth Circuit equated the "reasonableness" standard of Muller with
"convenience" and held that forum non conveniens balancing
standards should govern in rem proceedings.
The Court in the instant case determined that the lower courts had
given insufficient consideration to the forum selection clause in the
towage contract. After tracing the judicial history of forum selection
clauses in the United States, the Court cited extensive international
recognition of the desirability of enforcing agreements freely made by
contracting parties and dismissed the "ouster" and "public policy"
arguments as vestigial legal fiction.3" The Court acknowledged that
the forum selection clause was negotiated at arm's length by highly
sophisticated, knowledgeable businessmen and concluded that the
clause was a vital part of the agreement on which the parties had
undoubtedly relied in allocating insurance costs. The Court
emphasized that international development and continued commercial
expansion would be hampered by American insistance on litigating all
disputes concerning her citizens in domestic courts. Turning to the
Fifth Circuit's improper application of the forum non conveniens
burden of proof, the Court held that the burden of showing the forum
selected in the contract to be unreasonable or invalid for such reasons
as fraud or overreaching was on the party resisting enforcement of the
clause. Bisso was distinguished on the grounds that the appropriate
considerations in contracts for towage in American waters are not the
same as those in international waters. Finally, the Court rejected
respondent's contention that petitioner had availed itself of the
United States courts by filing the limitation proceeding and therefore
was precluded from challenging the propriety of the district court's
hearing the other charges. 3" Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that
the forum selection clause was an integral part of an unenforceable
32
exculpatory clause and, therefore, should not be given effect.

vessel and in personam against the shipowner for damage to and non-delivery of
the cargo. The Court of Appeal (Fifth Circuit) distinguished Muller as an action in
rem and, without espousing or rejecting Muller as to actions in personam, refused
to give effect to the choice of forum clause." Denning, Choice of Forum Clauses
in Bills of Lading, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 17, 29-30 (1970)
(footnotes omitted).
30. 407 U.S. at 9-10. The Court adopted the argument of Judge Wisdom's
dissenting opinions in the circuit court. See 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1971);
446 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1971).
31. Respondent's attempt to characterize the clause in question as ambiguous
was dismissed by the Court as "specious."
32. 407 U.S. at 23.
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The instant decision, in honoring contractually conferred jurisdiction, is a commendable attempt to bring domestic law more into
harmony with international custom and comparative practice. Moreover, the decision furthers predictability in world commerce; by giving
effect to the just expectations of parties having contracted from
positions of equality, the Court attempted to synthesize and liberalize
prior inconsistent and parochial decisions. In seeking to achieve this
end the Court used broad language that invites extension of this
decision to international contracts generally. Unfortunately, numerous
realities may thwart in practice what appears in theory to be an
effective vehicle for change. For example, the developing countries of
the Third World may challenge the existence of the international
custom that the instant decision assumes. 3
In addition, it is
unfortunate that the Court did not clearly endorse the prorogation4
derogation distinction as an aid in analyzing forum selection cases
and thereby make these analytical tools available to common law
attorneys, since much of the confusion that exists in the earlier
American decisions is the result of a failure to distinguish between
decisions of prorogated and derogated courts in their determinations
of whether a forum selection clause should be enforced. The primary
advantage of utilizing the civil law classification is that it would better

33. Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a
Part of Universal InternationalLaw?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961). Among the
questions that must be addressed is whether failure to confer exclusive jurisdiction
permits the interpretation that the forum selected is but one of many acceptable
forums. See Wescott v. Alsco Products of Canada Ltd., 45 Mar. Prov. 394, 26
D.LR.2d 281 (Newf. 1961) (by selecting a particular court the parties had
not excluded courts with concurrent jurisdiction). The court should insure that
the parties do, in fact, have their dispute heard in the selected forum by dismissing
subject to the commencement of proceedings in the selected forum. See Olympic
Corp. v. Societ6 G6n6rale, 462 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1972) (defendant's crosselaim
for indemnification dismissed contingent upon filing the action in the French
courts).
34. Numerous scholars have noted the inconsistency and confusion that
surround choice of forum clauses. See, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 729 (1968); Collins, Forum Selection
and an Anglo-American Conflict-The Sad Case of The Chaparral, 20 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 550, 553 (1971). Two excellent sources that synthesize the
mechanics, advantages and disadvantages of the civilian method of analysis are
available. See Lenhoff, supra note 18 (survey of various civil law countries'
utilization of this method, with emphasis on European nations); The Validity of
Forum Selection Clauses: Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the
American Foreign Law Association, 13 AM. J. CoMp. L. 157 (1964) (collection
of six papers).
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accomplish the Court's objective of furthering predictability in world
commerce by providing a method of analysis less vulnerable 3tos
restrictive interpretation than that provided in the instant decision.
Notwithstanding the possibility of future restrictive interpretation
because of the Court's failure to adopt the civil law classifications, the
instant decision should be applauded by all who seek the development
of uniformity in transnational law.
Ralph C. Oser

35. In Indussa, for example, an excluded (derogated) court overruled the
decision made by a selected (prorogated) court in Muller. This is only one
example of the unnecessarily inconsistent decisions that result because of the
imprecision of the analytical tools available. The full adoption of these principles
can still be achieved, however, either by a comprehensive advisory judgment by
the Court or through private parties' incorporating the principles by reference.
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TAXATION-FOREIGN
UNDER SECTION

901

TAX CREDIT-FoREIGN INCOME TAX CREDIT
ALLOWABLE

ONLY

FOR TAXES IMPOSED ON NET

GAIN OR PROFIT

Plaintiff, a national banking association,1 brought suit 2 for refund
of federal income taxes, challenging the Internal Revenue Service's
determination that certain taxes paid to foreign governments3 were
not creditable against its United States tax liability. Plaintiff contended that the foreign taxes levied on its general banking business4
were income taxes within the meaning of § 901(b)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 19541 and, therefore, creditable under § 901(a).6
The United States alleged that the taxes were not income taxes within

1. Plaintiff's principal office is located in San Francisco, California. In addition, it has branch offices in Bangkok, Manila and Buenos Aires.
2. These were consolidated cases, the first of which involved the taxable years
1959 and 1960. As a result of a Philippine tax credit carry-over from 1958 to
1959, 1958 was also involved in the first case. The second case was based on the
taxable year 1961.
3. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the following taxes were not
creditable: Kingdom of Thailand, Business Tax, Type 1 and Type 2, Municipal
Tax and Receipts Tax; Republic of the Philippines, Tax on Banks; Republic of
Argentina, Tax in Substitution of Surcharge on Free Transfer of Property, City of
Buenos Aires Tax on Profit-Making Activities and Contribution to the Bankers'
Institute for Social Services. The Service did allow credits for the Thailand Companies Income Tax and Profit Remittance Tax, the Philippines Tax on Foreign
Corporations and the Argentina Corporation Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax.
4. The business conducted at these branch offices included the making of
commercial, real estate and personal installment loans, the rendering of trust
department and property management services, foreign exchange transactions, the
issuance of letters of credit, guarantees, travelers' checks and cashiers' checks, and
the acceptance of trade paper.
5. The relevant portions of § 901 are:
"(a) Allowance of Credit.-If the taxpayer chooses to have the benefit of this
subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject to the applicable limitation
of section 904, be credited with the amounts provided in the applicable paragraphs of subsection (b) ....
(b) Amount Allowed.-Subject to the applicable limitation of section 904, the
following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under subsection (a):
(1) Citizens and domestic corporations.-Inthe case of a citizen of the United
States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any income, war profits, and
excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country
or to any possession of the United States; .... "
Section 904 provides a per-country limitation, which is the amount of the United
States tax on income from sources in that foreign country. The taxpayer may
elect an overall limitation under § 904 (2). The amount of the overall limitation is
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the meaning of § 901 because they were imposed on gross, rather
than net, income. The Trial Commissioner 7 allowed credits for the
four gross income taxes involved.' On review by the Court of Claims,
held, reversed. The controlling factor in determining whether a foreign
tax is creditable under § 901 is whether it is directed at net gain or
profit, not whether it is characterized as an income or excise tax. Bank
of America Trust and Savings Ass'n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513
(Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1972).
The foreign tax credit was instituted in 1918 to eliminate double
taxation of foreign source income Since its inception, however, the
credit has been restricted to foreign income taxes. 1o In Biddle v.
Commissioner," the Supreme Court held that to be creditable a

the amount of the United States tax on aggregate foreign source income. Section
903 allows credit for taxes paid in lieu of income, war profits and excess profits
taxes. This provision was not at issue in the instant case.
6. Taxes that are not allowed as credits against a taxpayer's tax liability are
allowed as deductions for the taxable year within which paid or accrued under §
164(a)(3).
7. Pursuant to Court of Claims' Rule 53(a), every case commenced in the
Court of Claims is referred to a trial commissioner, unless otherwise ordered by
the court. Rule 52 sets forth thq authority of the trial commissioner. The Court of
Claims Rules are found in 18 U.S. SUPREME COURT DIGEST (LAWYER'S
EDITION) ANNOTATED

(1968).

8. The Thailand Business Tax, Type 1 and Type 2, the Philippines Tax on
Banks and the City of Buenos Aires Tax on Profit-Making Activities.
9. Basically, Congress reaffirmed its decision to tax United States citizens and
corporations on worldwide income. The argument that the burden of taxation in
the foreign jurisdiction and in the United States placed American corporations at
a disadvantage led to the elevation of foreign taxes from the status of deductions
to credits. Surrey, CurrentIssues in the Taxation of CorporateForeign Investment
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 818 (1956). One should keep in mind that the avoidance of double taxation is closely connected with two of the basic principles of
our tax system--tax equity and tax neutrality. Tax equity dictates that all citizens
who are similarly situated and located in the same tax jurisdiction should be
subject to the same tax burden. Tax neutrality is related to economic decision
making. The tax system should not be a significant factor for the investor to
consider when weighing the relative merits of various investment locations. The
tax system should not provide incentives or disincentives to foreign investment.
The logical result of tax equity and tax neutrality is that foreign source income
should be taxed just as domestic source income, unless already taxed in the
foreign jurisdiction. L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN INCOME 44-56 (1964).
10. Surrey, supra note 9, at 819.
11. 302 U.S. 573 (1938).
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foreign tax 12 must conform to the United States concept of an income tax as articulated in the applicable revenue statute." A recurring
question has been the extent to which gross receipts 4 must be reduced by deductions to arrive at "income" as that term is interpreted
under United States revenue law. 1s Several courts have held that taxes

12. A threshold question not in issue in the instant case is whether the levy is
a tax. The criteria for this determination are that the purpose is to collect
revenues, that the proceeds are paid to a government and used for public purposes
and that the levy is not payment for specific services. E. OWENS, THE FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT

31-33 (1961).

13. The Court stated: "The phrase 'income taxes paid' as used in our own
revenue laws, has for most practical purposes a well understood meaning to be
derived from an examination of the statutes which provide for the laying and
collection of income taxes. It is that meaning which must be attributed to it as
used in § 131 [now § 901]." 302 U.S. 573, 579 (1938). The statement is
actually dictum, since the issue in Biddle was not the definition of "income taxes
paid." In Biddle, the question presented was whether the taxpayer, as a shareholder in a British corporation, was entitled to a credit for the British standard tax
withheld by the corporation from the taxpayer's dividends. Nevertheless, Biddle is
often cited for the proposition that the United States concept of an income tax is
controlling. For a discussion of the Biddle case see OWENS, supra note 12, at
29-30, 364-66.
14. Gross receipts less the costs of goods sold is the general definition of gross
income. Treas. Reg. 1.61-3(a)(1957). Net income is determined by deducting general business expenses from gross income. It should be noted that in businesses
dealing in services as opposed to goods, as in the instant case, gross receipts equal
gross income. OWENS, supra note 12, at 40.
15. In the initial cases on the sixteenth amendment, the Court merely held
that the amendment insured that taxes on income remained in the indirect category of taxes, thereby avoiding the requirement of apportionment found in article
I, § 9, clause 4 of the Constitution. The Court held that Congress always had the
power to tax income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916);
Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916). In Eisner v. Macomber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920), however, the Court took a different tack and held that a tax on
income was a direct tax but that the apportionment requirement did not apply so
long as the tax was on income. A definition of income, therefore, was required;
the Court defined income as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined." 252 U.S. at 207. In a ruling under the 1909 corporate income
tax, the Court held that to determine gain an amount equal to the recovery of
capital must be deducted from gross receipts. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247
U.S. 179, 185 (1918); accord, Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Hobert, 231 U.S.
399, 415 (1913). Beyond the recovery of capital, however, deductions appear to
be a matter of legislative grace. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940);
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). These decisions lead
to the conclusion that income is a gross, rather than a net, concept. More recently,
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not levied 1 6 on net income do not qualify as income taxes within the
meaning of the tax credit provisions. These taxes have been characterized consistently as privilege, 11 franchise or excise taxes. 's For
example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. United States, "9 the Court of

Claims found that the premiums tax in question was measured by
gross income or gross receipts. The court held that since the United
States concept of income is based on gain or profit, as opposed to
gross income or gross receipts, the premiums tax was an excise tax and
therefore not creditable as an income tax. Similarly, several revenue
rulings have held that to be creditable a foreign tax on business
revenues must be levied on profit. 2 0 A separate line of authority,
however, has held that a tax on gross income does qualify for the tax
credit.

1

In Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner,22 the taxpayer paid

however, in determining that punitive damages constitute taxable income, the
Court stated that the definition in Eisner "was not meant to provide a touchstone
to all future gross income questions." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The question whether "income" in the United States tax
system is a gross or net concept-a question that is a function of the deductions
required-hasnot beenresolved. See R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 335-73 (rev.
ed. 1945); J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 115-26
(1967).
16. The distinction between taxes levied on gross income and those measured
by gross income must be noted. Taxes levied on gross income have generally been
held to be income taxes, whereas taxes merely measured by gross income have
been held to be excise taxes. OwENs, supra note 12, at 39 n.39.
17. In Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies, 133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943), the tax involved, which was imposed by the Quebec
Mining Act, was measured by gross income. The taxpayer was allowed to deduct
costs incurred in the actual mining operation, but not general business expenses.
The court held that the tax was on the privilege of mining, because it was independent of realization, gain or derivation of profit.
18. In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn.

1942), the court ruled that a Canadian premiums tax was an excise tax. The court
found that the tax was not based on gain or profit, even though measured by a
percentage of net premiums less net premiums paid for reinsurance.
19. 419 F.2d 409 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
20. Rev. Rul. 55-455, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 288; Rev. Rul. 3778, 1946-1
CuM. BULL. 111; I.T. 3774, 1945 CUM. BULL. 204; G.C.M. 18182, 1937-1
CUM. BULL. 149.

21. In addition to the authorities that have specifically held that a gross income tax qualifies for the credit, others have implied that these taxes qualify. In
Eitingon-Schild Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 1163 (1931), the Board of Tax

Appeals found that a French turnover tax (a tax imposed on the amount of
business done in France) was an excise tax. The Board, however, indicated that a
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a three per cent tax on gross income imposed by Cuba on foreign
shipping companies. This tax had replaced a six per cent tax on net
income in the Cuban tax structure. For this reason, the Board of Tax
Appeals stated that the tax was an income tax, not an excise tax. In
addition, the Board held that under the sixteenth amendment Congress could tax gross income, and that the allowance of deductions
was solely a matter of legislative grace. The Board then held that gross
income taxes were creditable. In Santa EulaliaMining Co. v. Commissioner, 23 the taxpayer owned a mining concession and had a royalty
agreement with the Mexican corporation that operated the mine. The
Mexican Government imposed a ten per cent tax on royalties, which
were measured by the amount of ore extracted with allowable deductions for mining expenses but not business expenses. Although the
Internal Revenue Service had ruled that the tax was not creditable, 2 4
the court applied the Seatrain rationale and held that the tax was
creditable as an income tax even though it was imposed on gross
income. Compounding the uncertainty in this area, the Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that a Brazilian tax levied on the gross

tax on gross income might qualify as an income tax: "We find no provision in the
French statute in question which we are able to construe as imposing a tax on
income or profits, either gross or net [emphasis added]." 21 B.T.A. at 1174. The
Board made the same determination in ruling on a Philippine "privilege" tax that
was based on the value of goods exported. Elias Mallouk v. Commissioner, 34
B.T.A. 269, 273 (1936).
22. 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942).
23. 2 T.C. 241 (1943).
24. Rev. Rul. 3320, 1939-2 CUM. BULL. 191. The Internal Revenue Service
has not acquiesced in either of these two decisions. When the Internal Revenue
Service loses a case in the Tax Court, the Commissioner will often indicate in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin whether or not he acquiesces. This notice indicates
whether the Service accepts the principle enunciated in the case. If the Commissioner does not acquiesce, the Service will not utilize the principle of that case in
disposing of other cases and may litigate the same issue if it arises again. J.
CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 14 (1968). The
nonacquiescences are noted at 1942-2 CUM. BULL. 31 (Seatrain)and 1943 CUM.
BULL. 39 (Santa Eulalia).
The first line of authority usually distinguishes the second by holding that the
tax in question is an excise tax, not an income tax. One writer has attempted to
reconcile these decisions by distinguishing between those in which the taxes are
imposed on separate items of income and those in which the taxes are imposed on
general business receipts. The former is construed as income, unless the purpose of
the tax is not to reach income. The latter, however, is not an income tax unless
the tax base is net income. OWENS, supra note 12, at 52-53. This categorization,
however, does not satisfactorily account for the Seatrain decision.
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income derived from real property of nonresident individuals and
corporations may be credited. 25
In the instant case, the court found that because plaintiff was not
allowed to deduct business expenses, the taxes in question were imposed on gross income. However, the court also found that the taxes
in question were not franchise, privilege or excise taxes. The court
noted that while the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress may
impose taxes on gross income, tax legislation consistently has reached
only net gain. The court concluded, therefore, that the overriding
consideration is not whether the foreign income tax is labelled a gross
income or net income tax, or whether deductions are specifically
allowed, but whether the foreign government is attempting to reach
some net gain. In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that a tax
imposed on gross income would be directed at net gain if expenses
were clearly less than gross income, i.e. that there would always be
some net gain remaining. The court noted that crediting only such
taxes would eliminate or minimize the double taxation of income.
Since the three per cent tax on gross income in Seatrain had replaced a
six per cent tax on net income in the Cuban tax structure, the court
concluded that it was a "formulary" tax-a gross income tax that
inherently recognizes the taxpayer's costs and expenses. Similarly, the
court determined that because the taxpayer in Santa Eulalia did not
operate the mine, but merely received royalties, no expenses of the
taxpayer were likely to outbalance the gain. In addition, it was concluded that the Brazilian tax on nonresidents' gross income was
credited because the tax eventually reached net gain and that the
Internal Revenue Service must have assumed that income from investment, taxed at its source, rarely is offset entirely by expenses. 26 The
court noted that in the cases in which nondeductible expenses could
have negated gross income, which would result in a loss to the tax-

25. Articles 96 and 97 of the Brazilian Income Tax Law No. 4178, dated
March 13,1942, as amended by Decree-Law No. 5844 of September 23, 1943 and
Law No. 154 of November 25, 1947, subject income derived by individuals and
corporations from sources in Brazil to the withholding tax at the source. The
ruling noted the similarity of these provisions to the treatment accorded nonresident alien individuals and nonresident foreign corporations in § 211 and § 231(a)
of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code [§ § 871, 881 of the 1954 Code]. Rev. Rul.
4013, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 65.
26. Reviewing the current federal income taxes on gross income, namely the
social security provisions and § § 871, 881, 882 and 1441 pertaining to nonresident aliens, the court also concluded that these are imposed only in those
instances in which it is clear that costs would not negate gross income.
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payer, credit for foreign taxes had not been allowed. The court held
that because the nondeductible expenses in the instant case could
produce a loss, the foreign taxes in question were not directed at net
gain 2 7 and therefore were not creditable.
The instant decision is the first case in which a court has found that
the tax in question was not a franchise, privilege or excise tax and still
refused to allow the credit. In attempting to reconcile the two lines of
prior authority, the court has, in effect, created a third category-a
noncreditable income tax. The test established by the court-whether
the tax in question is directed at net income-was founded on unwarranted assumptions and erroneous distinctions. For example, the court
cited no authority for the proposition that the basis of the revenue
rulings concerning nonresident gross income taxes is the Service's
assumption that nonresident gross income rarely is offset entirely by
expenses. Moreover, the court distinguished Seatrain by finding the
tax in question to be a "formulary" income tax, and by determining
that the Board of Tax Appeals credited the tax because it was directed
at net income. The court distinguished Seatrain on the Board's finding
that the three per cent gross income tax had replaced a six per cent
net income tax in the Cuban tax structure. The Board of Tax Appeals,
however, had examined the Cuban tax structure merely to ascertain
whether the tax in question was an excise or an income tax-all income taxes, whether on net or gross income, were considered creditable. Secondly, the court's test provides no guidelines for determining
whether a gross income tax is directed at net gain. The court stated
merely that a tax is not so directed if expenses could offset gross
income. Under this rationale, no tax on gross business income that did
not allow deductions for expenses could be construed as a creditable
income tax. If this is the court's position, a more direct solution
would have been to follow Allstate and hold that the tax is an excise
tax. Notwithstanding the court's methodology, the instant decision
has advanced the state of the law to the extent that it was based on
the purpose of the foreign tax credit, i.e. the avoidance of double
taxation. Consequently, the court avoided the irrelevant constitutional
question whether income is a gross or net concept. The primary consideration is whether the foreign tax has an equivalent in the United
States tax system. The present tax statutes, with their liberal
allowance of deductions, can be characterized as imposing taxes on
net income. Therefore, only a foreign tax on net income will subject a

27. The court also noted that these taxes were imposed in addition to general

net income taxes levied in each of the three jurisdictions. Plaintiff had received
credit for the net income taxes.
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taxpayer to double taxation. An argument against this position is that
because net income is included in gross income a foreign tax on gross
income still subjects the income to double taxation. It is generally
accepted, however, that taxes on gross income can be shifted. ' In
practice, therefore, the taxpayer would not bear the burden of a
foreign tax on gross income. Aside from the economic arguments,
crediting only net income taxes-as a matter of statutory interpretation-comports well with the purpose of the tax credit. Since Congress
has not chosen to tax gross business income, 29 the decision to credit
such foreign taxes should be made by Congress.
David A. Boillot

28. OWENS, supra note 12, at 85 & n.179.
29. In some instances Congress has taxed gross income. See materials cited
note 25 supra. But Congress has not taxed the gross income of domestic corporations, so that the taxpayer would be subjected to double taxation if he were
required to pay a foreign gross income tax.
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